Formalizing Gratuitous And Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory by Hirsch, Adam J.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 4 
2014 
Formalizing Gratuitous And Contractual Transfers: A Situational 
Theory 
Adam J. Hirsch 
University of San Diego 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous And Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 797 (2014). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
797 
Washington University 
Law Review 
 
VOLUME 91 NUMBER 4 2014   
 
FORMALIZING GRATUITOUS AND 
CONTRACTUAL TRANSFERS:  
A SITUATIONAL THEORY 
ADAM J. HIRSCH

 
ABSTRACT 
By tradition, gifts, wills, and contracts are formalized according to 
protocols established within each legal category. This Article examines 
the policies that underlie these “formalizing rules” and concludes that the 
utility of those rules depends fundamentally on the background conditions 
under which a gift, will, or contract occurs. Those background conditions, 
rather than the category into which the transfer falls, dictate the optimal 
formalizing rule for a transfer. In light of this observation, this Article 
proposes an integrated approach to formalizing rules that varies the 
required formalities for a transfer on the basis of situational criteria 
rather than the prevailing categorical ones.  
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INTRODUCTION 
An owner who intends to transfer property into the hands of another 
must employ a legal vehicle suitable to the occasion. When a transfer 
occurs during the owner’s lifetime, and is made without material 
compensation, the transfer takes the form of a gift. The same gratuitous 
transfer, when planned to take effect at death, instead comes about via a 
will. Finally, a transfer of ownership made in exchange for ownership of 
different property occurs by virtue of a contract. These represent the three 
voluntary carriages of property.
1
 And each is formalized—that is to say, 
rendered legally operative—according to its own, unique requirements: 
gifts are formalized classically by delivery of the gift corpus; wills, by a 
writing and an execution ceremony, conducted in the presence of 
witnesses; contracts, in many instances, by a mere parol agreement 
 
 
 1. We could also conceptualize the trust as an instrument of transfer, although it is more exact 
to say that a trust is created by gift or by will. We shall address the problem of formalizing trusts 
below in Parts II and V. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/1
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between the parties.
2
 Considered structurally, the “formalizing rules” for 
transfers, as we shall call them, thus vary by legal category.
3
 In theory, 
those categories have defined boundaries and cover mutually exclusive 
sets of transfers. 
This Article proposes a different organizing principle for formalizing 
rules. It assays prior discussions of the jurisprudence of legal formalities 
and distills from them various situational criteria that dictate the need, vel 
non, for particular aspects of formality in any given instance. As we shall 
see, those situational variations cut across the traditional categorical lines. 
My thesis is that formalizing rules for transfers would better serve their 
purposes if lawmakers broke down the rules not by legal category, but by 
other characteristics of the transfers in question. Transfers that share the 
same situational characteristics should be treated alike from the standpoint 
of formalizing rules, irrespective of whether those transfers fall under the 
rubric of gifts, wills, or contracts. In the process, we could unify the three 
categories of transfer, at least insofar as formalizing rules are concerned.
4
 
We may rate this reorientation as particularly useful in those instances 
where categories of transfer have become distorted. Lawmakers have seen 
fit to permit certain types of transfers to masquerade as different ones—
allowing these transfers to operate, so to say, under assumed names. 
Formalizing rules divided by legal category may be suboptimal in general; 
those tied to nominal classifications become arbitrary and dysfunctional in 
particular. A new framework for formalizing rules based upon a transfer’s 
objective characteristics would avoid such arbitrariness, a considerable 
fringe benefit when categories of transfer have become corrupted by 
fiction.  
As usual, the analysis shall progress in stages. In Part I, we lay our 
theoretical foundation by rehearsing and examining the accepted (and not-
 
 
 2. Other modes of formalization have come and gone. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.3 cmt. b (2003); infra text accompanying notes 
191–92. For an ancient formalizing rule for gifts, developed before even the invention of papyrus, see 
THE HAMMURABI CODE: AND THE SINAITIC LEGISLATION § 165, at 32 (Chilperic Edwards ed., 3d ed. 
1921) (c. 2084–81 BC) (“seal[ing] . . . a tablet”). 
 3. Formalizing rules are not confined to the law of transfers but also pertain to the formation of 
other sorts of relationships and statuses, such as an agency or a marriage. See, e.g., UNIF. DURABLE 
POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 1 (amended 1984), 8A U.L.A. 233, 246 (2003). The instant discussion 
focuses exclusively on the formalization of transfers of property. 
 4. In prior work, I have offered a unified analysis of default rules for transfers, see Adam J. 
Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1031 (2004) [hereinafter Hirsch, Default Rules], and of mandatory rules setting the boundaries of 
freedom to make transfers, see Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 2180 (2011) [hereinafter Hirsch, Freedom]. The instant discussion extends this 
program of categorical unification. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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so-well accepted) visions of the functions of formalizing rules. The next 
three parts explore how formalizing rules operate in a variety of settings 
that might affect the benefits that various modes of formalization bring to 
the table. Part II looks at transfers that occur hard on the decision to make 
them. Part III addresses transfers that take place, by contrast, only after an 
interval of time has passed. Part IV completes the trio by considering 
transfers that again unfold rapidly, but near the death of the transferor. 
Finally, in Part V, we turn to the special problem of formalizing transfers 
that are not what they seem—transfers whose properties belie the legal 
category to which they are conventionally assigned. 
I. THEORETICAL PROLOGUE 
A. The Progenitors 
The problem of formalizing rules has attracted a modicum of scholarly 
attention over the years and inspired two articles widely recognized as 
classics in their respective fields. Both appeared, coincidentally, in the 
same year—1941—and as a consequence neither cites to the other. These 
are Dean Ashbel Gulliver and Catherine Tilson’s Classification of 
Gratuitous Transfers, focusing on wills,
5
 and Professor Lon Fuller’s 
Consideration and Form, focusing on contracts.
6
 A comparative reading 
reveals that these two sets of scholars, working independently, had been 
thinking along similar, if not quite parallel, lines—and in one instance 
even lighted on the same nomenclature.  
As Gulliver and Tilson emphasized from the outset—and Fuller surely 
agreed—formalities “should not be revered as ends in themselves.”7 
Because a failure to meet formalities can invalidate transfers and hence 
frustrate intent, they require substantive justification. Gulliver and Tilson 
identified, first of all, what they called the “ritual function” of formality.8 
“Casual language, whether oral or written, is not intended to be legally 
operative,” and lawmakers would thwart intent if they gave language 
merely contemplating a transfer greater effect.
9
 By requiring transferors to 
 
 
 5. Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE 
L.J. 1 (1941). 
 6.  Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). 
 7. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 3. See also Fuller, supra note 6, at 805 (“Forms must be 
reserved for relatively important transactions. We must preserve a proportion between means and end 
. . . [and] support the use of a form if a form is needed . . . .”).  
 8. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 4. 
 9. Id. at 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/1
  
 
 
 
 
2014] FORMALIZING GRATUITOUS & CONTRACTUAL TRANSFERS 801 
 
 
 
 
engage in “some ceremonial” in order to render a transfer effective, 
lawmakers help to clarify transferors’ “finality of intention.”10 Calling this 
instead the “channeling function,” Fuller elaborated the point: Formality 
both “signalize[s]” and “canalize[s]” intent to render a transfer 
enforceable, furnishing “a simple and external test of enforceability,” as 
well as an indication of the kind of transfer intended.
11
 Formalities serve 
not only to clarify intent to a court, Fuller pointed out, but also afford 
parties a simple means of making their intentions known to each other, 
thereby facilitating agreements “out of court,” without the need for a state 
proceeding to ratify transfers.
12
 Translated into economic jargon, formality 
reduces error costs in the understanding and adjudication of what sort of 
transfer, if any, the transferor sought to make, while simultaneously 
offering him or her an efficient means of clarifying intention. 
The other principal purpose of formality is to provide reliable proof of 
a transfer’s authenticity and substantive terms, thereby again conducing to 
adjudicative accuracy when a court sets about reconstructing those terms. 
Both Gulliver and Tilson, and Fuller dubbed this purpose the “evidentiary 
function” of formality, and both in common acknowledged its centrality.13 
Beyond that, the authors parted company. Gulliver and Tilson 
identified what they called the protective function of formality—that is, 
protecting a party from undue influence or duress by ensuring that other 
persons witness the transfer.
14
 Gulliver and Tilson deemed this function 
significant only for dying transferors, whose “normal judgment and . . . 
resistance to improper influences may be seriously affected by a decrepit 
physical condition, [or] a weakened mentality.”15 Others subjected to 
 
 
 10. Id. at 3–4. For a judicial recognition, see for example Estate of Utterback, 521 A.2d 1184, 
1188 (Me. 1987) (observing that will formalities serve “to provide a reliable source of the testator’s 
intent expressed under circumstances where the testator fully understands the significance and 
permanence of [his or her] statements”). 
 11. Fuller, supra note 6, at 801–02. 
 12. Id. at 801–02. Compare the formalization of marriage, where tradition demands a proceeding 
of some sort to ratify the change of status. 
 13. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 6–9; Fuller, supra note 6, at 800. For a judicial 
recognition, see for example Estate of Charitou, 595 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (Sur. Ct. 1993) (indicating 
that will formalities function “to protect a decedent’s estate, preserve the integrity of a testator’s plan 
for the distribution of his assets, and to close the door as far as possible to the obvious temptations of 
fraud, perjury, and collusion”).  
 14. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 9–10. For a judicial recognition, see for example Bell v. 
Timmins, 58 S.E.2d 55, 59 (Va. 1950) (remarking that will formalities operate “to prevent forgery and 
imposition”). 
 15. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 10. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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momentary influence or duress retain the power to challenge (or, in the 
case of wills, simply to revoke) the transfer ex post facto.
16
 
Undue influence and duress likewise constitute grounds for overturning 
a contract.
17
 Nevertheless, Fuller ignored the protective function 
altogether. Instead, he brought up another purpose of formality that, for 
their part, Gulliver and Tilson had failed to identify. By infusing transfers 
with symbols of “weightiness,” formalities cause transferors to take heed 
and thereby “act[] as a check against inconsiderate action.”18 Fuller termed 
this the “cautionary function” of formality, serving to produce the degree 
of “circumspecti[on] . . . appropriate in one pledging his future.”19 Again 
translated into modern jargon, Fuller here accepted that formalities can 
serve paternalistic ends, protecting a transferor against the hazards of 
subsequent regret. Fuller did not, however, take the occasion to advocate 
any mandatory regulation of the behavior of transferors. Formalizing rules 
operate, in Fuller’s conception, simply to cause transferors to think twice. 
In this connection, he became an early advocate of what we would today 
call libertarian paternalism.
20
 
B. The Successors 
These two treatments of the problem of formalities appeared over 
seventy years ago. Nothing lasts forever, of course, but some intellectual 
fashions wear better than others. Both Gulliver and Tilson’s, and Fuller’s 
studies remain widely cited to this day.
21
 Nevertheless, a number of 
subsequent scholars have expanded on, or reacted to, these works, offering 
up an assortment of analyses that merit consideration. 
In unison, Professors Lawrence Friedman, John Langbein, and Bruce 
Mann, all focusing on wills, identify another virtue of formalizing rules in 
their potential to promote standardization: “Compliance with the Wills Act 
formalities for executing witnessed wills results in considerable uniformity 
 
 
 16. Id. at 9–10. 
 17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174–77 (1981). 
 18. Fuller, supra note 6, at 800. 
 19. Id. 
 20. For a discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not 
an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). For a criticism, see Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005). See also infra note 178. 
 21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. c & reporter’s note; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. a & reporter’s 
note 1 (1998); In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991). For a modern discussion 
elaborating on Fuller, see Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and 
Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1974). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/1
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in the organization, language, and content of most wills.”22 On first sight, 
the suggestion seems surprising; after all, the manner in which a transfer is 
executed has no direct bearing on its content. In theory, uniformity of 
execution could be accompanied by a cacophony of expression. But in 
practice, laypersons often recognize that formalizing rules exist without 
fully comprehending how to satisfy them. Their desire to meet the 
requirements leads them to seek professional counsel, and that counsel 
knows how to structure a transfer (and express an intention).
23
 At least one 
court made the same supposition years before any of these scholars did.
24
  
To be sure, this molding of expression comes at a price. Ordinarily, we 
achieve efficiency by reducing transaction costs; encouraging professional 
intervention instead causes those costs to increase. But transaction costs 
here are tied to, and function to diminish, the eventual administrative costs 
of implementing transfers judicially—a cost that the state traditionally 
subsidizes.
25
 In this context, the immediate cost borne by parties is, by 
hypothesis, more than made up for by subsequent savings to the state. It 
would appear that courts, which bear the burden, agree with this 
assessment. Homemade wills are notorious litigation breeders,
26
 and courts 
can be found (wearily) complaining about them between the lines of their 
opinions.
27
 
 
 
 22. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493–94 
(1975) (quotation at 494); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the 
Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 367–68; Bruce H. Mann, 
Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1036, 1048 
(1994). Inspired by Fuller, Professor Langbein confusingly labels this the “channeling function,” see 
Langbein, supra, at 493, although what he means by this term differs from what Fuller had meant by 
it. 
 23. See Friedman, supra note 22, at 367–68; Langbein, supra note 22, at 493–94. 
 24. Said the New Jersey Supreme Court: 
[One] not [professionally] advised may easily trip in the execution of [will] formalities, and it 
would rather seem that the Legislature may have intended him therefore to look to counsel for 
assistance. The Legislature may have deemed—and with reason—that the interposition of a 
person schooled in those formalities and draftsmanship would serve, in part, to prevent 
mistakes in drafting the will. 
In re Taylor’s Estate, 100 A.2d 346, 348 (N.J. 1953). 
 25. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good? “Overcrowded Courts” and the 
Private Sector Alternative of Arbitration, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899, 899 (2013) (“Courts 
provide a service . . . heavily subsidized by tax dollars, as only a portion of courts’ costs are covered 
by fees paid by litigants.”).  
 26. For a recent discussion, see Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case 
Against Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 120–26 (2006). But cf. Stephen Clowney, In Their 
Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. 
L.J. 27, 38–43, 59–61 (2008) (finding no empirical evidence that homemade wills are more prone to 
litigation than executed wills, and criticizing prior empirical findings to the contrary). 
 27. See, e.g., Anthony v. Harris, 100 A.2d 229, 230 (Del. Ch. 1953) (“The court is confronted 
once again with the difficult problem of determining the meaning of an apparently ‘home made’ 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In economic terms, then, we can justify the imposition of expensive 
formalities on parties as functioning to avoid spillover costs—internalizing 
the negative externality created by state-supported construction 
proceedings for transfers formulated in ambiguous ways. Given the 
inefficiency of spillover costs, lawmakers might go a step further and 
require either professional drafting or the use of statutory forms (currently 
made available for will-drafting as an option in a number of states
28
). 
Alternatively, lawmakers could eliminate spillover costs by discontinuing 
the subsidy for construction proceedings.
29
 Either move would comprise a 
major break with tradition, however, and would entail significant 
transition costs.
30
 By merely encouraging standardization indirectly, 
lawmakers avoid those costs.  
Professor Mark Glover suggests a quite different purpose served by 
will formalities, at odds with the functions addressed so far, and implicitly 
distinguishing formalizing rules for wills from those applicable to other 
transfers: namely, to obstruct rather than to facilitate testation.
31
 In 
Glover’s analysis, formalities serve as “barriers” to will execution, by 
making the process more tedious, time consuming, and costly.
32
 In 
“making the exercise of testamentary power difficult,” Glover asserts, “the 
formal execution process serves a family-protection policy,”33 because 
only the surviving spouse and blood relatives take as intestate heirs. 
Glover contrasts the elaborate requirements for executing a will with the 
simple rules for revoking one, achieved by nothing more than the physical 
act of destroying or cancelling the document with intent thereby to render 
it ineffective. The law makes formal execution relatively difficult and 
 
 
will.”); In re Estate of Weiss, 279 A.2d 189, 192 n.2 (Pa. 1971) (“This is another case of a holographic 
will[,] which is sometimes disheartening.”). 
 28. Statutory will forms are intended to guide testators who write their own wills toward a more 
standardized, less litigation-prone product. Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-In Will Forms—The First 
Decade: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 782 (1993). 
 29. See supra note 25. 
 30. For an economic discussion of the general problem of legal transitions, see Louis Kaplow, 
Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161 (2003).  
 31. Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s 
Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411 (2009). Cf. Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, 
and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 167–79 (1989) (questioning more fundamentally the functional 
explanations for formalities as premised on false assumptions about human nature). 
 32. Glover, supra note 31, at 432–33. 
 33. Id. at 453. Cf. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 
236–38, 258–68 (1996) (arguing that courts have manipulated formalizing rules to invalidate wills that 
fail to provide for a testator’s family members). Glover distinguishes his thesis from Leslie’s: “Instead 
of protecting family interests by merely providing courts a means to invalidate wills to nonfamily 
members, will formalities promote family protection by their very operation.” Glover, supra note 31, 
at 413. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/1
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revocation relatively easy, Glover submits, in order to render intestacy the 
path of least resistance—and lawmakers have “designed”34 these rules 
with this bias in mind. 
The perversity of Glover’s analysis is readily apparent. His suggestion 
that formalities function to discourage effective will-making contradicts 
the longstanding ideology of inheritance law, whose central tenet is 
freedom of testation.
35
 Lawmakers and courts at least purport to view 
formality as a sort of necessary evil intended to realize freedom of 
testation by ensuring that only the testator’s true wishes are put into 
operation, while recognizing that some testators will nevertheless trip over 
the formalities and forfeit that freedom. At times, lawmakers may have 
failed to get the balance right. Remarking on an English act of 1677 which 
required at least three attesting witnesses for a will devising land, Lord 
Mansfield observed—hardly approvingly—that “many more fair wills 
have been overturned for want of the form, than fraudulent have been 
prevented by introducing it.”36 At the same time, Mansfield maintained, 
Parliament “did not mean to restrain testamentary dispositions of land” but 
rather had “thought [the rules of attestation] would soon be universally 
known, and might very easily be complied with.”37 The act’s effect was 
unforeseen. More recent courts likewise object to formalities that serve, in 
Mansfield’s words, to “spread a snare.”38 “The philosophy underlying the 
provisions on execution of wills . . . is to allow every citizen the right and 
privilege of disposing of his property as he sees fit,” one court insists, and 
“[t]his absolute right would be a solemn mockery, if any mere arbitrary 
rules were suffered to frustrate and defeat that intention.”39 Other courts 
echo this sentiment, claiming that the formal requirements “are not 
intended to restrain or abridge the power of a testator to dispose of his 
property. . . . [They] are not designed to make the execution of wills a 
mere trap and pitfall . . . .”40 
 
 
 34. Glover, supra note 31, at 453. 
 35. E.g., Whaley v. Avery (In re Wilkins’ Estate), 211 N.W. 652, 653 (Wis. 1927) (“This sacred 
right to make a will rests entirely with the testator, who under our law can dispose of his property in 
accordance with his volition . . . .”); Ball v. Boston (In re Ball’s Estate), 141 N.W. 8, 10 (Wis. 1913) 
(“As often, and not too often, said, the testamentary right is one of the most important of the inherent 
incidents of human existence.”). 
 36. Windham v. Chetwynd, 97 Eng. Rep. 377, 381 (K.B. 1757).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. 1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting) (quoting Paul 
v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10, 13 (1868)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40. Robinson v. Ward, 387 S.E.2d 735, 738 (Va. 1990) (quoting French v. Beville, 62 S.E.2d 
883, 885 (Va. 1951) and Bell v. Timmins, 58 S.E.2d 55, 59 (Va. 1950)) (internal quotation marks 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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To the extent that he is right, then, Glover has identified a policy that 
lawmakers pursue surreptitiously. That need not make it any less real. 
When confronted with legal principles that they wish to override, some 
lawmakers might be tempted to tackle those principles covertly, as Karl 
Llewellyn noticed long ago in connection with encroachments on freedom 
of contract.
41
 To turn around an old adage, some things are easier done 
than said. But Glover’s interpretation fails to account for the modern 
statutory trend in favor of rolling back testamentary formalities that appear 
superfluous.
42
 Nowadays, as the Uniform Law Commissioners observe, 
“formalities for a . . . will are kept to a minimum,” in order “to validate 
wills whenever possible.”43 Under Glover’s model, superfluity should 
comprise a virtue, and the formalities of execution should remain thick 
and robust. 
The asymmetry between will formalization and revocation that Glover 
finds so telling in fact conforms to a more widespread pattern identified 
earlier by Fuller: “There is in our law a noticeable, though not consistently 
expressed tendency to treat the surrender of rights differently from the 
creation of rights. . . . In general it may be said that it is easier to give up a 
right than to create one.”44 Fuller surmised that a lower threshold of 
formality can often accomplish its purposes in connection with the 
surrender of rights,
45
 and that, in fact, appears to be the case here: 
Revocation by act involves an action that the testator performs upon an 
executed will, one that lay culture recognizes as imbued with symbolism, 
and which bespeaks finality without the need for a ceremony, expressing 
the withdrawal of intent to make whatever distribution the will specified. 
 
 
omitted); see also In re Fouche’s Estate, 23 A. 547, 548 (Pa. 1892) (suggesting that it would be “cruel” 
to testators to add to existing will formalities). 
 41.  
Our courts are loath indeed to throw out a contract clause under the plain justification that it is 
contrary to public policy, that it is such a clause as “private” parties cannot make legally 
effective . . . . But . . . we have developed a whole series of semi-covert techniques for 
somewhat balancing these bargains.  
K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702 (1939) (reviewing O. PRAUSNITZ, THE 
STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)) 
(emphasis in original). For modern jurisprudential discussions, see Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, 
The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1994); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential 
Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995). 
 42. For a discussion and references, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1057, 1067–68 (1996). 
 43. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 5, gen. cmt. (amended 2010) (pre-1990 art. 2), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 
491 (2013). 
 44. Fuller, supra note 6, at 820. 
 45. See id. at 820–21. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/1
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The testator can perform no comparable action initially to express intent to 
make any one of an infinite number of alternative distributions by will. He 
or she can only do so by using words—words that then require 
solemnization in some more elaborate way.  
As a prescriptive model, even putting aside the propriety of legal 
subterfuge, Glover’s analysis stands vulnerable to criticism. At a 
functional level, freedom of testation and protection of the family are not 
incompatible policies. On the contrary, one of the accepted virtues of 
freedom of testation is that it exploits the comparative advantage of 
testators to craft estate plans benefitting successors, taking into account the 
unique circumstances of each family; by comparison, intestacy law 
operates mechanically and inflexibly.
46
 At another level, the pattern of 
inertia that would result if lawmakers placed needless obstacles in the way 
of testation invites criticism. In economic terms, formalities make 
intestacy law a so-called “sticky” default rule47—but the burden falls 
disproportionately on testators of lesser means, for they are more apt to be 
deterred by, or to fall prey to, punctilious formalities. We can question the 
equity of a system of succession that discriminates along socioeconomic 
lines, defeating the intent of the poor while giving free rein to the 
preferences of well-heeled testators.
48
 Only mandatory rules, applicable to 
all, can afford equal protection for the families of testators.
49
 
We should therefore reject this account of formalizing rules as 
unsound, both descriptively and prescriptively.
50
 The public policy in 
favor of protection of the family fails to justify any difference between the 
specification of will formalities and other transfer formalities.  
In another provocative critique, shifting back to the contracts side, 
Professor Eric Posner argues that most of the functions of formality 
 
 
 46. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. 
L.J. 1, 12–13 (1992); see also Langbein, supra note 22, at 499–501 (anticipating Glover’s critique). 
 47. E.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 S.M.U. 
L. REV. 383 passim (2007). 
 48. For a further discussion, see Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 4, at 1051–52. 
 49. The fact remains that no regime of testation can wholly escape discrimination as an 
epiphenomenon, because transaction costs never drop to zero, even in the absence of any required 
formalities. Professor Ian Ayres calls this limitation “the iron law of default inertia.” Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1598 (1999).  
 50. In another recent work, Professor Glover suggests that legal formalities also have 
psychological consequences for testators, although it remains unclear how those consequences are 
distinct from the psychological consequences of estate planning per se. See Mark Glover, The 
Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 139 (2012). Cf. Mark Glover, A 
Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427 (2012). If 
formalities served primarily to afford testators peace of mind that their wills would be put into 
practice, then those formalities would not have to be mandatory.  
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identified by Fuller fail to withstand analysis.
51
 Relating formalizing rules 
to the mandatory and default rule paradigm, Posner argues that 
formalizing rules should become mandatory (as they traditionally are) only 
when they serve some clear economic purpose—otherwise, parties should 
retain the right to bargain around them, avoiding the transaction costs that 
they impose. Although the principal functions of formality that Fuller 
lighted on aid and abet contracting parties, “they do not explain why the 
Statute of Frauds and other formalities should [be] . . . immutable.”52 
Hence, in respect of the need to signal the finality of a contract, “there 
is no reason that the use of a writing should necessarily count as a 
signal.”53 Parties to a contract “could send such a signal by simply stating 
orally whether they desire legal enforcement or not. If they want to 
increase the likelihood of the result they desire, they might write it 
down.”54 No interests other than those of the contracting parties are 
implicated. Likewise, if they could decide for themselves whether or not to 
undertake the expense of memorializing their agreement in order to reduce 
evidentiary error costs, parties would make the choice that better served 
their interests in any given instance.
55
 The one component of the 
evidentiary function that Posner acknowledges as justifying a mandatory 
rule is the avoidance of fabricated agreements, which harm innocent third 
parties.
56
 Accordingly, “[t]he optimal formality is a rule that prescribes an 
act that is cheap for a promisor to engage in but costly for a wrongdoer to 
mimic.”57 
Posner makes a valuable contribution when he points out how the 
market itself could, in theory, sort out optimal levels of formalization. In 
some respects, the process might efficiently regulate itself, at least among 
sophisticated parties who understand the costs and benefits. But for those 
who do not—including many gratuitous transferors—information costs 
would create an imperfect market for formalities, again justifying state 
intervention in the shape of mandatory formalizing rules.
58
 What is more, 
 
 
 51. See Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A Comment, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1971, 1980–86 (1996). 
 52. Id. at 1981–84 (quotation at 1983–84). 
 53. Id. at 1984 (emphasis in original). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 1984–85. 
 56. See id. at 1982–83, 1986. 
 57. Id. at 1983. 
 58. Although Posner focuses exclusively on the formalization of contracts, he notes in passing 
the question whether his critique also applies to, or confronts “some crucial distinction” with respect 
to, the formalization of wills. Id. at 1984 n.18. See also id. at 1985 (raising and responding to another 
potential objection to his thesis). 
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Posner fails to perceive the difficulties inherent in finalizing transfers 
without a mandatory formalizing rule. Words alone fail to denote finality 
unless we already have some external, accepted means of distinguishing 
what the philosopher J.L. Austin called “performative” words from 
communicative ones.
59
 A formalizing rule creates such a bright dividing 
line. If parties sought merely to say when their words were final, in the 
absence of a required formality, the finality of those assertions about 
finality would remain ambiguous, leading to an infinite regress.
60
 In 
connection with transactions, like contracts, that parties engage in 
frequently, social customs might nevertheless crystalize in the absence of 
legal rules to permit parties unambiguously to finalize deals. In the United 
States, the proverbial handshake, when coupled with words, would appear 
to operate in this capacity as an “informal” formalizing rule.  
C. Analysis 
What conclusions can we draw from this overview of formalizing 
rules? Individual modes of formality (such as witnessing) can serve 
multiple purposes simultaneously, and those purposes also appear 
complementary. Hence, we have no need to introduce balancing tests here. 
Furthermore, and crucially for purposes of our analysis, the uses of 
formality appear contextual. Whether any given formality will prove 
efficacious, in light of its ends, depends on the circumstances. Fuller was 
first to propound the idea: “The need for investing a particular transaction 
with some legal formality will depend upon the extent to which the 
guaranties that the formality would afford are rendered superfluous by 
 
 
 59. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 
1975). For words to become unambiguously performative “[t]here must exist an accepted conventional 
procedure having a certain conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain words 
by certain persons in certain circumstances.” Id. at 26.  
 60. Once parties have finalized a transfer via legally accepted formalities, the agreement or 
instrument of transfer might create its own formalizing rules for any subsequent modifications of the 
transfer. Here, at least, any such variation from the formalizing rules that would otherwise apply will 
have been ratified by the original agreement or instrument which did comply with the applicable 
formalizing rules. Hence, the parties’ intent to abide by the variation is unambiguous. In some 
instances, lawmakers expressly allow this sort of ex post revision of the formalizing rules for transfers. 
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(c)(1) (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 546 (2006) (allowing the settlor of a 
trust to specify the means of its subsequent revocation or amendment). But in other instances, 
lawmakers expressly disallow such ex post revisions, a doubtful policy judgment. See UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 2-512 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 231 (2013) (codifying the common-law acts of 
independent significance doctrine, which forbids testators from specifying in a will purely formal acts 
that will operate thereafter to modify the will). For a criticism of the doctrine of acts of independent 
significance, see Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1083–89.  
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forces native to the situation out of which the transaction arises . . . .”61 
Examining the problem inter-categorically, we can expand on Fuller’s 
insight. The need for, or superfluity of, any given formality depends more 
fundamentally on “forces native to the situation”62 than on the type of 
transfer at issue. Put otherwise, the category into which a transfer falls 
does not, in and of itself, alter the circumstances in consequential ways, 
although certain types of transfers may be statistically associated with 
particular circumstances that, in turn, either augment or diminish the 
utility of a given formalizing rule. 
Consider again the principal functions of formality. Lawmakers can 
clarify the finality of intent by introducing a ritual or action of some sort to 
accompany, or even to substitute for, words expressing a transfer. Such a 
ritual or action serves to distinguish the final word from preliminary 
contemplations as concerns any variety of transfer. But at the same time, 
the events leading up to, or attending, a transfer could already function to 
draw the desired distinction, producing what Fuller called “natural 
formality.”63 In the presence of natural formality, the artificial sort 
becomes redundant and therefore unnecessary for lawmakers to require.
64
  
More concrete variables present themselves in connection with other 
aims of formalizing rules. As Gulliver and Tilson observed, the need to 
protect testators from duress or undue influence depends upon their 
vulnerability.
65
 Those in good health with a strong will are, we might say 
by analogy, “naturally protected.” Likewise, the benefit of lawyer-
generated standardization varies with the complexity of the terms of a 
transfer.
66
 A simple transfer is “naturally standardized.” And in respect of 
both variables, the type of transfer at issue again appears irrelevant. 
Complex wills, gifts, and contracts all profit from professional drafting; 
simple ones, not much.  
Lastly, the value of the evidence generated by a formality—be it a 
writing, or the presence of witnesses—also depends on several factors: 
 
 
 61. Fuller, supra note 6, at 805 (emphasis omitted). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 815. 
 64. Fuller made the same observation in connection with his proposed cautionary function: 
“Whether there is any need . . . to set up a formality designed to induce deliberation will depend upon 
the degree to which the factual situation, innocent of any legal remolding, tends to bring about the 
desired circumspective frame of mind.” Id. at 805; see also supra text accompanying notes 18–19. 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 14–16. 
 66. For a brief recognition of the relevance of complexity as a situational variable, see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 5, statutory note (1981). For an early recognition, see 
JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 189, 525 
(John Bowring ed., 1962) (1827). 
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(1) the availability of the parties themselves to substantiate the relevant 
facts about a transfer, (2) the space of time that elapses before such a 
factual reconstruction becomes necessary, and (3) the complexity of the 
terms that require reconstruction. Because “forgery may be more difficult 
to achieve than perjury,”67 and certainly requires greater effort, writings 
provide a bulwark against fraud. And they also protect against lapses of 
memory concerning complicated or bygone facts. 
This last point, however, we should not accept too hastily. The popular 
notion that memory decays over time, like a radioactive isotope, was 
exploded as early as the 1930s.
68
 Items of fact may be forgotten at one 
point in time and then called back to mind at another. The process does not 
unfold along a constant slope, or even necessarily a continuous line. 
That said, psychological studies of memory do raise the concern that 
temporal distance can endanger the accuracy of recollection. The 
accumulation of memories of similar episodes interferes with a subject’s 
ability to recall accurately any single one of them.
69
 Here, we might expect 
to find some variation among different sorts of transfers, stemming from 
their variable frequency. Parties who make or witness wills probably stand 
at less risk of memory loss caused by episodic interference, because will 
execution occurs so rarely.
70
 By contrast, business persons who make 
deals for a living, embarking on more contractual transfers than they can 
count, should have greater difficulty recalling any one of them. 
Eventually, though, the onset of old age causes organic changes in the 
brain that can damage long-term memory for every elder, even in the 
absence of cognitive pathology.
71
 Donors, testators, witnesses, and 
contracting parties alike are bound to become forgetful sooner or later. In 
addition, the routine experience that complicated data are more difficult to 
remember than simple data—a function of our limited capacity to process 
data into memory—is well-accepted today and confirmed by any number 
 
 
 67. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-8, at 112 (6th ed. 
2010). 
 68. For the classic study, see John A. McGeoch, Forgetting and the Law of Disuse, 39 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 352 (1932). 
 69. For a review, see John T. Wixted, The Role of Retroactive Interference and Consolidation in 
Everyday Forgetting, in FORGETTING 285 (Sergio Della Sala ed., 2010). 
 70. At the same time, personnel within law firms often serve repeatedly as witnesses for wills 
executed at firm offices.  
 71. For a recent discussion, see Bryce A. Mander et al., Prefrontal Atrophy, Disrupted NREM 
Slow Waves and Impaired Hippocampal-Dependent Memory in Aging, 16 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 
357 (2013). For a review, see David A. Balota et al., Memory Changes in Healthy Older Adults, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MEMORY 395 (Endel Tulving & Fergus I.M. Craik eds., 2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
812 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:797 
 
 
 
 
of formal studies.
72
 Again, this phenomenon relates to every kind of 
transfer. Finally, and with finality, death erases all trace of a subject’s 
memory.  
If we are to pursue a minimalist approach to the formalities of transfer, 
accepting (to recall Gulliver and Tilson, but pace Glover) that they are not 
ends in themselves,
73
 and recognizing that they contribute to transaction 
costs, we need to take situational variables into account when we fashion 
formalizing rules.  
II. SPOT TRANSFERS 
Let us begin with the simplest of all situations: immediate transfers, 
occurring in the prime of life. Memorialization of a transfer, while always 
useful, is not vital in this context. Evidentiary confirmation or 
disconfirmation of a transfer becomes a straightforward process when the 
transferor and transferee can each testify as to what one did, or did not, 
communicate to the other, and this information will remain fresh in their 
minds. If parties’ testimony conflicts as to immediate facts, the jury steps 
in as our lie detector to ferret out fraud. Only if the terms of an immediate 
transfer are complex, making honest discrepancies of recollection more 
likely, does memorialization become paramount. The value of 
standardization likewise rises in direct proportion to complexity. And 
whereas rituals are not indispensable with respect to spot transfers, given 
that parties can report whether they intended their words to be legally 
operative, rituals do serve to signal finality, and thereby to avoid mutual 
misunderstanding, if no natural or customary rituals already lie at hand.  
Under existing doctrine, the formalizing rules applicable to spot 
transfers have become fragmented, varying by category, and even by sub-
category. Although long accepted, the prevailing configuration of these 
rules merits reexamination. 
A. Contracts 
In the transactional realm, spot transfers take the form of short-term 
contracts. Under the statute of frauds, the applicable formalizing rule for a 
contract depends upon its subject matter. Short-term contracts for services 
 
 
 72. For a classic discussion, see George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus 
Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81 (1956). For a 
modern review, see René Marois & Jason Ivanoff, Capacity Limits of Information Processing in the 
Brain, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 296 (2005). 
 73. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
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fail to come within the statute, and hence parol agreements for those 
services are binding; no memorialization or ritual of any sort is required.
74
 
By comparison, the statute of frauds demands a signed writing for 
contracts covering real property.
75
 Finally, with respect to contracts for the 
sale of personal property, the statute of frauds further distinguishes goods 
of small and large value. As codified in the Uniform Commercial Code, 
contracts for goods worth $500 or more require a signed writing; contracts 
for goods worth less than that do not.
76
 Originating in England with the 
enactment of the first statute of frauds in 1677, this tripartite framework 
prevailed in the United States for most of its history.
77
 The U.C.C. adds a 
further refinement, distinguishing from the sale of goods contracts for 
intangible securities, which require no writing.
78
 On top of these subject-
matter distinctions, several more discrete classes of contract based on the 
nature of the contractual obligation—specifically, contracts establishing a 
suretyship and those made in consideration of marriage—require a signed 
writing, again tracing to the English statute of frauds.
79
 
From a policy perspective, distinctions of formality based on the 
subject matter of (or the nature of an obligation under) a contract appear 
arbitrary.
80
 Contracts covering real or personal property, tangibles or 
intangibles, and goods or services, pose identical problems of ritual and 
evidence.
81
 Hence, the formalizing rules that apply to them, whatever they 
may be, ought to operate symmetrically. 
Turning to the formalities themselves, the virtues of a writing 
requirement for short-term transactions, even for contracts involving large 
sums (which represents a subjective standard), seem doubtful. In the 
commercial arena, the bargaining table lends a kind of natural solemnity to 
the occasion, lessening the need for an artificial ritual to clarify parties’ 
 
 
 74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (“A promise may be stated in words 
either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct.”). 
 75. Id. §§ 110(1)(d), 125. 
 76. U.C.C. § 2-201 (amended 2010).  
 77. For a historical summary, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 5, statutory note.  
 78. See U.C.C. §§ 2-105(1), 8-113. Contracts for other intangible rights are not covered by the 
U.C.C., as revised in 2001. See id. § 1-206 legislative note. 
 79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 110(1)(a)–(c) & cmt. a, 111–12, 124. 
 80. For an early recognition, see Hugh Evander Willis, The Statute of Frauds—A Legal 
Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 430–31 (1928). 
 81. Although title to real property is recorded, recordation protects third parties and in most 
states is unnecessary to complete an agreement between the buyer and seller of real property. 11 
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 92.04(a) (David A. Thomas ed., 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter 
THOMPSON]. For an early criticism of the subject-matter distinctions established by the English statute 
of frauds as applicable to wills prior to 1837, see BENTHAM, supra note 66, at 533, 543–45.  
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intent to be bound.
82
 In any event, those engaged in business, and even lay 
parties dealing with commercial actors, have evolved customary gestures 
for signaling agreement, enabling parties unambiguously to cement a 
deal.
83
 As for evidence, the parties themselves can bear witness to their 
dealings. Memorialization and standardization become important only 
insofar as the terms of a contract are complex, likewise complicating their 
reconstruction and interpretation. But the parties to business contracts 
already know all of that, and lawmakers can count on them to bring in the 
typists and the lawyers when they serve a purpose. As Posner perceived,
84
 
formalization becomes a self-regulated process when sophisticated actors 
are involved.  
The only other arguable merit of a writing requirement is to diminish 
the risk of fraudulent evidence.
85
 But when parties can defend themselves 
in court, submitting sworn testimony and threatening cross-examination, 
and when criminal penalties operate concurrently to deter fraud, we may 
rate this risk as relatively small. It was not always thus. In the period when 
the statute of frauds first came into effect, and continuing until the second 
half of the nineteenth century, rules of evidence barred interested parties 
from testifying in open court.
86
 From an evidentiary perspective, that made 
spot transactions (as of then) indistinguishable from those (as of now) 
where parties have died, thus again precluding their testimony—which 
presents a different situational problem, with a greater risk of evidentiary 
error and fraud, that we shall return to later on.
87
 The demise of the old 
common law of evidence changed the nature of the problem, but the 
statute of frauds failed to change along with it.
88
 
 
 
 82. For a discussion of the ritual element of dickering, see BROMLEY KNIVETON, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING 47–57 (1989); see also supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra text following note 60.  
 84. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 56–57. 
 86. England was first to abolish this rule in mid-century, and American states followed suit one 
by one over the next several decades. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 65, at 313–14 (Kenneth S. Broun 
ed., 6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]. 
 87. See infra Parts III & IV. 
 88. Or rather, the American statute failed to change. England’s Parliament abolished the statute 
of frauds as it applied to the sale of goods in 1954. The first draft of the revised Article 2 of the 
U.C.C., circulated in 1990, would have done the same, but the provision was restored within 
subsequent drafts. As finally proposed in 2003, the revised Article 2 would have retained the statute of 
frauds for the sale of goods but would have raised the value threshold from $500 to $5,000. In any 
event, the Uniform Law Commission withdrew the revised Article 2 in 2011. U.C.C. § 2-201, 1D 
U.L.A. 28 (2012) (amendments proposed in 2003); see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 67, § 3-1, at 
88, § 3-8, at 113. 
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In sum, laborious formalities attached to short-term contracts implicate 
unnecessary costs, hindering and delaying transacting parties who hold 
time dear. Time is money, and parties themselves can decide whether 
formalizing a spot transaction is, so to say, time well spent. All else being 
equal, lawmakers should build this carriage of property for speed.  
B. Gifts 
Meanwhile, in the gratuitous realm, spot transfers take the form of inter 
vivos gifts made by parties who may lack commercial actors’ professional 
sophistication. Again, the formalizing rules for gifts have splintered along 
lines similar to the ones discovered within the law of contracts. Once 
more, one finds little evidence that these rules have evolved methodically. 
Under the common law, gifts of all forms of personal property are 
formalized by delivery and—in contradistinction to contracts—no 
contemporaneous (or, for that matter, non-contemporaneous) 
communication is required to render the gift complete, although the 
transferor must intend the transfer to comprise a gift for it to take effect as 
one.
89
 Under the traditional view, delivery must be “manual,” a literal 
movement of the gift corpus into the hands of the donee (or the donee’s 
agent), unless manual delivery is impossible or impractical.
90
 In that event, 
the donor can substitute an alternative form of delivery—either 
constructive delivery of something (such as a key) that opens up access to 
the gift, or delivery of a writing describing the gift.
91
 The modern view, 
acknowledged nowadays by many courts, permits these alternative forms 
of delivery irrespective of the ease of manual delivery.
92
  
At the same time, and for no substantial reason, gratuitous transfers of 
services are excluded from the law of gifts.
93
 Hence, a donor can only 
 
 
 89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 6.1(a), 6.2 
(2003).  
 90. Impossibility or impracticality may stem from the character of the gift corpus (which might 
be unwieldy or intangible) or because of logistical impediments. 
 91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 & cmts. c, g, 
& h; RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 7.5–.6, 7.10 (Walter B. 
Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975).  
 92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. c & 
reporter’s note 4; see, e.g., Carey v. Jackson, 603 P.2d 868, 869–76 (Wyo. 1979) (giving effect to a 
gift via delivery of a writing, without manual delivery, even though the gift corpus was easily portable 
and the donor and donee lived next door to each other). For a discussion of the older cases, noting the 
deterioration of the limitation, see BROWN, supra note 91, §§ 7.5, at 93–94, 7.6, at 94–96.  
 93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. a & 
reporter’s note 1 (failing to explain the exclusion); see also RICHARD HYLAND, GIFTS: A STUDY IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW ¶¶ 317, 353 (2009) (explaining the exclusion as stemming from the abstract 
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finalize a gratuitous transfer of personal services by performing them, not 
by formalizing them as gifts.
94
 In at least one respect, the substantive rules 
of these two subcategories also diverge.
95
 But when we turn to gifts of 
services that a donor undertakes to supply but that a different party will 
perform, the law of contracts becomes implicated. A donor can formalize 
such a donative third-party beneficiary contract by mere parol agreement 
with the service provider, and the donor can simultaneously finalize the 
gift by disallowing discharge or modification under the terms of the 
contract.
96
  
Finally, the statute of frauds again distinguishes gifts of real property, 
which a donor can only effect by preparing a written deed of gift, coupled 
(at a minimum, depending on the state) with a signature, and “delivery” of 
the deed.
97
 But in the context of gifts of real property, as one commentator 
observes, delivery becomes a term of art: “the definition . . . , as applied to 
deeds, is not the same as the ‘traditional’ concept of delivery. The 
touchstone for delivery in deed cases is the intent of the grantor . . . .”98 
Physical transfer of the deed to the donee need not occur, although such a 
transfer can suffice to manifest intent.
99
 Essentially, in the context of real 
property, lawmakers have traded one formality—the writing 
 
 
distinction that “delivery is a requisite of an effective gift . . . [but] is generally not thought to 
encompass the performance of services”) (footnote omitted). 
 94. A gratuitous promise to perform services is of course unenforceable, as it lacks consideration. 
See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 95. Whereas the common law makes a rebuttable presumption that services performed between 
family members are gratuitous, no analogous presumption attaches to transfers of personal property 
between family members. Compare, e.g., Plowman v. King (In re Pauly’s Estate), 156 N.W. 355, 356 
(Iowa 1916) (making the presumption for services); Andrews v. Div. of Med. Assistance, 861 N.E.2d 
483, 486 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (same), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a (“[D]elivery [of personal property] is an ambiguous act,” although 
“the relationship between the owner and deliveree,” inter alia, is “relevant” to the inquiry); Sihler v. 
Sihler, 376 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding evidence of spouse’s intent to make a 
gift of personal property he had delivered on the basis of evidence other than the parties’ relationship). 
Perhaps the justification lies in the fact that, whereas personal property might be bailed, services can 
only be provided either gratuitously or for hire.  
 96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 304, 311(1) (1981); see also 3 E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 10.8 (3d ed. 2004); supra text accompanying note 74.  
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.3 & cmts. b–d 
& reporter’s note 1. 
 98. 9 THOMPSON, supra note 81, § 83.03(b), at 745 (ch. by Ronald R. Volkmer). By “traditional” 
the author means to refer to the traditional concept of delivery under civil law which “emphasizes a 
transfer of possession.” Id. § 83.03(b) at 744.  
 99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.3 & 
cmt. d & reporter’s note 2; 9 THOMPSON, supra note 81, § 83.03(b). Thus, “The term ‘delivery’ . . . is 
ill-suited to describe the essence of what is involved . . . .” Id. § 83.03(b), at 746; see also, e.g., Howell 
v. Herald, 197 S.W.3d 505, 509, 511 (Ky. 2006) (giving effect to an executed but undelivered deed of 
gift). 
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requirement—for another.100 Yet, no attribute unique to real property 
justifies its distinction from personal property in this regard.
101
 
In fact, no one argues that a gift’s subject matter matters as concerns 
the public policy of formalizing rules. Like the analogous distinctions 
within the realm of contract law, those discovered within the law of gifts 
answer no material purpose—although they do serve as a reminder, if one 
were needed, of the universality of Justice Holmes’s legal equation that “a 
page of history is worth a volume of logic.”102 
Not only are the formalizing rules for gifts internally inconsistent, but 
in several instances they are also inconsistent with their counterparts 
within the law of contracts. Whereas contracts for tangible goods may be 
made by parol agreement below a value threshold, and above that 
threshold only by a signed writing, gifts of tangible goods are formalized 
by delivery in all instances.
103
 Whereas contracts for intangible securities 
are effective by parol agreement irrespective of their value, gifts of 
intangible securities require delivery of either the share certificates 
themselves or a writing describing the securities.
104
 Parties can formalize 
contracts for services by parol agreement but cannot formalize gifts of 
personal services at all.
105
 And while contracts in consideration of 
marriage come within the statute of frauds, gifts in anticipation of 
marriage do not; hence, gifts in anticipation of marriage are formalized no 
differently from other gifts.
106
 The statute of frauds has operated to 
consolidate only the formalizing rules for contracts and gifts of real 
property, and for suretyships, which ordinarily operate as enforceable 
 
 
 100. Formalities for a deed of gift are traditionally more rigorous than those applicable to writings 
delivering a gift of personal property. Cf. infra notes 186, 188 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 102. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.3 cmt. b (summarizing the historical background 
of the statute of frauds). 
 103. See supra notes 76, 89 and accompanying text. In addition, special formalizing rules may 
operate by state statute for the contractual sale of registered tangible property, such as automobiles and 
boats. Cases conflict, however, over whether the same formalizing rules apply to gifts of registered 
tangibles. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. i & 
reporter’s note 10; HYLAND, supra note 93, ¶ 874.  
 104. See supra text accompanying note 78; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. h; HYLAND, supra note 93, ¶¶ 914–15, 917. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 74, 93–94. 
 106. See supra text accompanying note 79. Gifts in anticipation of marriage are subject to special 
rules of construction, but not formalizing rules. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmts. l–m. 
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contracts, even when they are gratuitous,
107
 all of which require a signed 
writing.
108
 
Should the formalizing rules for gifts correspond with those applicable 
to classical contracts? Should a gift, in other words, become enforceable 
via an objective offer (“I hereby give you my Porsche”109) and acceptance 
(“Thank you!”110) by donor and donee? If necessary, parties can testify as 
to what they said, or failed to say, irrespective of whether the transfer at 
issue is a gift or a contract. In an early study of gift formalities, predating 
by a decade and a half the contributions of both Gulliver and Tilson, and 
Fuller,
111
 Professor Philip Mechem defended the delivery requirement for 
gifts as corresponding with the “ordinary experience and the fundamental 
habits of the human mind.”112 By virtue of its “normality,” delivery 
clarifies that the donor intended an enforceable gift and avoids 
misunderstanding by the donee.
113
 Put into the theoretical context of 
Mechem’s successors, delivery provides an unambiguous ritual for 
finalizing gifts.
114
 Mechem observed that a delivery requirement also 
provides evidence helpful in forestalling fraud, “it [being] easier to 
fabricate a story than to abstract the property.”115 Finally, Mechem 
anticipated what Fuller went on to call the cautionary function,
116
 insofar 
as it related to the delivery requirement for gifts, which “forces upon the 
most thoughtless and hasty at least a moment’s acute consideration of the 
effects of what he is proposing to do.”117 
 
 
 107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 88 & cmts., 112 cmt. a (1981). 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 75, 79, 97–100.  
 109. Such language of immediate gift is distinct from a promise to make a gift, addressed below in 
Part III.B. 
 110. Acceptance of a gift is presumed in the absence of affirmative refusal. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1(2) & cmt. i. Likewise, silence can 
create a presumption of acceptance of a contract offer under some circumstances. For a discussion, see 
Michael Ansaldi, The Do-Nothing Offeree: Some Comparative Reflections, 1 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POLICY 43 (1992). 
 111. See supra notes 5–6. 
 112. Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action 
Evidenced by Commercial Instruments (pt. 1), 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 346 (1926). 
 113. Id. at 348 (asserting that delivery clarifies “what [the donor] means, or (which is perhaps 
even more important) what he is understood to mean”). For judicial recognitions, see, for example, 
Scherer v. Hyland, 380 A.2d 698, 700 (N.J. 1977) and Elmira Coll. v. Fid. Union Trust Co. (In re 
Dodge), 234 A.2d 65, 78 (N.J. 1967). 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
 115. Mechem, supra note 112, at 349. For a judicial recognition, see Scherer, 380 A.2d at 700. 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19. 
 117. Mechem, supra note 112, at 348–49. 
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None of these points is overwhelmingly persuasive. Just as negotiations 
provide natural formality for contractual agreements,
118
 the context of gift 
declarations can also imbue them with ritual significance. When 
verbalized on traditional gift-giving days—such as birthdays, Valentine’s 
Day, certain religious holidays, and graduation days—gift declarations 
come with a natural solemnity indicative of finality. Even when made on 
other occasions, gifts ordinarily are accompanied by some gesture of 
affection, analogous to the contractual handshake, that, when made along 
with a declaration of gift, should suffice to distinguish it from a careless 
remark.
119
 Arguably, current law is more callous to the risk of 
misunderstanding, in that delivery suffices to formalize a gift without any 
accompanying communication.
120
 Lawmakers apparently consider 
delivery itself an adequate form of expression—an action that speaks as 
loudly as words. Still, one can point to instances where deliverees have 
allegedly misconstrued deliverors’ intent, leading to litigation.121 Actions 
may be loud, but they are not always clear. A declaration requirement for 
gifts would help to clarify intent to make a donative transfer, as opposed to 
a loan or a bailment. But, of course, neither requirement (even if 
combined) offers complete immunity from ambiguity.
122
  
As far as evidence is concerned, as in connection with contracts, 
parties’ testimony can overcome fraud. If fear of fraud were paramount, 
then a writing requirement for all gifts, expanding on the statute of frauds, 
might do more good than a delivery requirement.
123
 Nor does a delivery 
requirement force parties to think twice before making an uncompensated 
transfer. People can either speak or act on impulse, and handing 
something over takes only a trifle longer than blurting out words. Again, a 
writing requirement would appear to serve the cautionary function more 
assuredly. 
Under existing doctrine, lawmakers allow donors to formalize gifts by 
virtue of an objective declaration, without any act of delivery—in other 
words, in a contract-like manner—under some circumstances. Suppose the 
 
 
 118. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 119. See supra text following note 60.  
 120. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
 121. E.g., Sihler v. Sihler, 376 So. 2d 941, 941–42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Cecil v. Smith, 821 
S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). But cf. Mechem, supra note 112, at 349 (“If [a party] hands 
over the property, he has done an act that will settle many doubts, an act perhaps capable of more than 
one interpretation, yet readily and naturally susceptible of but one.”).  
 122. See HYLAND, supra note 93, ¶ 894 (noting litigation generated by ostensible written 
declarations of gift expressing donative intent ambiguously). 
 123. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
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corpus of a gift already lies in the donee’s possession as a bailment. The 
donor now wishes to make a gift of that item to the donee. How can the 
donor accomplish the transfer? Physical delivery of an object to someone 
who already possesses it is impossible. Under these conditions, we might 
expect delivery of a writing or manual redelivery to serve as the operative 
formality. The law requires neither: rather, a donor can make the gift by 
oral declaration to the donee.
124
 Mechem defended this exception as 
corresponding with ordinary social practice and so producing “a minimum 
of friction [with] the mechanism of ordinary life.”125 Furthermore,  
where the res is already in the hands of the donee, the significance 
of his . . . words will be emphasized to the donor, and he will be a 
little less prone to an ill-advised donative expression than in the 
case where the res is safely in his hands.
126
 
As Fuller would have put it, a declaration of gift under these 
circumstances implicates “natural formality,”127 although not uniquely so. 
The fact that lawmakers are prepared to carve out this exception suggests 
at least the plausibility of its generalization. 
At the same time, another existing exception to the delivery 
requirement appears problematic within its situational context. Whereas 
the donor (or “settlor”) of a gift in trust must ordinarily deliver the trust 
property to the trustee to complete the gift, such an act becomes 
meaningless when the settlor is the trustee. Here again, lawmakers have 
waived the delivery requirement without substituting another ritual, 
allowing the settlor to create an enforceable trust by mere verbal 
declaration—to anybody.128 In this connection, though, some risk exists 
that a layperson will fail to appreciate the potential significance of his or 
her words. Declarations of trust are not typically made on gift-giving days 
and, because they need not be declared to the beneficiary, they might go 
unaccompanied by any gestures of affection.
129
 
 
 
 124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. d 
& illus. 3 (2003); BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.8; cf. infra note 244.  
 125. Mechem, supra note 112, at 365. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 128. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 401(2) (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 478 (2006); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 10(c) & cmt. e, 14 & cmt. c (2003). 
 129. Professor Mechem criticized the anomaly, adding that “were such transactions to become 
common, difficulties might be felt, and courts and legislatures moved to impose some limitation.” 
Mechem, supra note 112, at 353. For additional observations, see BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.21, at 
150; HYLAND, supra note 93, ¶ 961; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 16–17; C.B. Labatt, Note, The 
Inconsistencies of the Laws of Gifts, 29 AM. L. REV. 361 (1895). Perhaps in response, courts have 
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But the problem goes deeper than that. By its nature, any inter vivos 
trust, including one for which a third party serves as trustee, could feature 
more complex terms than apply to basic gifts. The trustee (and even 
settlors themselves) might have difficulty recalling the mass of those terms 
if communicated orally. Complex trusts call for memorialization, as well 
as standardization. Yet, unlike sophisticated actors, lay settlors might 
know no better than to do it all themselves. Here, a writing requirement, 
coupled perhaps with more arcane formalizing rules to encourage 
professional drafting, hold a certain appeal. 
The traditional rule, endorsed both by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners and the Restatement, draws no distinction between the 
formalization of simple gifts and complex trusts: Whether or not a settlor 
doubles as trustee, and hence whether or not coupled with delivery, inter 
vivos trusts are valid even when their terms are communicated orally. 
Only nine states today subject inter vivos trusts to more exacting 
formalization requirements.
130
 Such requirements, we should note, need 
not distinguish gifts from inter vivos trusts, if organized situationally. The 
element that would typically complexify a traditional inter vivos trust is 
the inclusion of future interests, which carry trusts out of the sphere of 
 
 
rejected “[c]hance[,] casual or hasty remarks or letters” as declarations of trust. BROWN, supra note 91, 
§ 7.21, at 147. The fact that a trustee has fiduciary duties to perform once a trust takes effect also helps 
to clarify the finality of a settlor’s intent to create a trust formalized by a declaration. Compare Hatch 
v. Lallo, No. 20642, 2002 WL 462862, at **2–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002) (finding that the 
settlor’s segregation of trust assets following a declaration of a trust under which the settlor served as 
trustee demonstrated intent to create the trust), with Ambrosius v. Ambrosius, 239 F. 473, 475–76 (2d 
Cir. 1917) (finding no intent to create a trust, despite a declaration of trust, where the settlor failed to 
account to the beneficiary or to segregate the corpus from his own assets, adding that the court “cannot 
believe that [the settlor] would have acted with such bad faith if he had supposed himself to be a 
trustee”), and Bank One of Milford v. Bardes, No. CA87-04-008, 1987 WL 32744, at *1–3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 31, 1987) (also finding no intent to create a trust, despite a declaration of trust, where the 
settlor continued to act “as if he owned [the trust property] in fee simple”). At the same time, courts 
sometimes look upon actions by a settlor-qua-trustee that are inconsistent with fiduciary duties 
following a trust declaration as indicative of a breach of trust. See, e.g., Knagenhjelm v. R.I. Hosp. 
Trust Co., 114 A. 5, 7–8 (R.I. 1921). 
 130. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 407 (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 489 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS §§ 10(b), 20. State statutes of frauds, however, require a writing to formalize a trust whose 
corpus includes real property. Id. § 22 & cmt. a. The nine exceptional states have adopted statutes to 
override judicial doctrine. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(9) (2012) (requiring a signed writing); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 53-12-20(a) (2012) (same); IND. CODE § 30-4-2-1(a) (2010) (same); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:1752 (2005) (requiring a witnessed writing); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-38-407 (West Supp. 
2013) (requiring a signed writing); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.17(a) (McKinney Supp. 
2013) (requiring either a witnessed or recorded writing); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7737 (West 
Supp. 2013) (requiring a writing); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.004 (West Supp. 2013) (requiring a 
signed writing); W.V. CODE ANN. § 44D-4-407 (West Supp. 2013) (requiring a writing). In two 
additional states, Delaware and Florida, only revocable inter vivos trusts are subject to special 
formalizing rules. See infra note 330 and accompanying text. 
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spot transfers and into the sphere that we shall call anticipatory transfers—
an area demanding greater formality for additional reasons, as we shall 
presently see.
131
 
A final trend in the law of gifts of personal property merits noting. 
Many modern (and even some early) courts have put forward what is best 
described as a remedial doctrine of gift formality, holding gifts valid 
where donors have died before they could complete delivery, at least if 
evidence of donative intent appears unequivocal. Courts have 
accomplished this outcome by stretching to find an effective delivery 
where none exists, or (more rarely) by misconstruing the attempted gift as 
a declaration of trust.
132
 
The public policy of waiving delivery in this context is complicated by 
another situational variable: The absence of the donor when the issue goes 
to court. It is this factor that creates pressure for remediation, since the 
donor has missed the chance to take the necessary steps to effect the gift. 
But the very same factor also heightens the risk of error and fraud, even 
when the court is convinced otherwise.
133
 However we ultimately weigh 
these competing considerations, we ought to resolve the tension 
consistently. A similar problem arises in connection with gifts of real 
property where the would-be donor failed during his or her lifetime to 
observe scrupulously the statute-of-frauds formalities. This issue is not 
exactly analogous, because the risk of fraud presented by a defective deed 
could differ from the risk of fraud posed by a defective delivery, a 
distinction lawmakers need to weigh in the balance.
134
 At any rate, 
 
 
 131. See infra Part III. In addition, revocable inter vivos trusts may be complex because, unlike 
irrevocable ones, they typically cover the entire estate of the settlor. And these, too, we would 
situationally classify as anticipatory transfers. See infra text accompanying notes 328–29.  
 132. See, e.g., Scherer v. Hyland, 380 A.2d 698, 701–02 (N.J. 1977) (misapplying the doctrine of 
constructive delivery and hinting at the legal fiction). For early cases, see infra note 138. For trust 
cases, most of which have eschewed recourse to a fictional declaration of trust, see 1 AUSTIN 
WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 5.1, at 232–35 & n.17 (5th ed. 2006). For 
academic observations, noting the doctrinal trend toward watering down the delivery requirement 
without indicating its confinement to cases where donors have died prior to the litigation, perhaps 
because that limitation is implicit, see BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.2, at 79; HYLAND, supra note 93, 
¶¶ 885–87; Chad A. McGowan, Special Delivery: Does the Postman Have to Ring at All—The Current 
State of the Delivery Requirement for Valid Gifts, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 357 (1996). For a 
commentary advocating the use of fictional declarations of trust in instances where a would-be donor 
dies before completing delivery, see Sarajane Love, Imperfect Gifts as Declarations of Trust: An 
Unapologetic Anomaly, 67 KY. L.J. 309 (1978–79). 
 133. I will argue that in those situations where they can anticipate the impossibility or 
unlikelihood of testimony by the donor of a gift, lawmakers should strengthen rather than weaken 
formalizing rules. See infra Parts III.B & IV.A. 
 134. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. yy 
(2003) (analogizing a doctrine giving effect to improperly delivered gifts with a harmless error 
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curative statutes do exist for certain violations of the statute of frauds 
applicable to transfers of real property, although they vary in scope from 
state to state.
135
 
In sum, a case can be made for consolidating the formalizing rules for 
gifts and contracts, both intra- and inter-categorically. The latest iteration 
of the Restatement proposes judicial steps in both directions. It suggests 
that written declarations of gift for personal property, like deeds of gift for 
real property, should require no delivery.
136
 And the Restatement also 
suggests that in those cases where evidence of donative intent is clear and 
convincing, that evidence alone should suffice to give effect to a gift of 
personal property, despite a lack of delivery, even (apparently) where the 
donor remains alive and might wish to change his or her mind after 
expressing a gift, a rule reminiscent of the common law of contracts.
137
 
Both of these moves merit consideration, but both remain aspirational; 
neither one “restates” existing law.138  
 
 
doctrine for improperly formalized wills, discussed infra notes 157–58, 160 and accompanying text).  
 135. 9 THOMPSON, supra note 81, § 82.08(e)(1). Compare Grabarz v. Waleski, 499 A.2d 433, 434 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (per curiam) (giving effect to a defective deed of gift by virtue of a curative 
statute), with Greenlee v. Mitchell, 607 So. 2d 97, 106 (Miss. 1992) (holding the curative statute 
inapplicable to the defect that appeared in a deed of gift). See supra text accompanying note 97. 
 136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmts. p 
& u; cf. id. § 6.3 cmt. d. 
 137. “[T]his Restatement adopts the position that a gift of personal property can be perfected on 
the basis of donative intent alone if the donor’s intent to make a gift is established by clear and 
convincing evidence.” Id. § 6.2 cmt. yy. The Restatement illustrates this rule with a hypothetical in 
which a donor expresses a gift but delivers neither the gift corpus—a block of lottery tickets—nor a 
writing to the beneficiary, without limiting the hypothetical to instances in which the donor dies before 
delivery occurs. See id. § 6.2 illus. 25. And the Restatement analogizes this rule, inter alia, to the rule 
allowing settlors who double as trustees to formalize trusts by mere oral declaration. See id. § 6.2 cmt. 
yy. Strictly speaking, though, the Restatement rule appears to judge the validity of the gift on the basis 
of subjective intent rather than an objective (contractual) standard. And, it must be added, the 
Restatement does not expressly authorize suits on gifts declared and then retracted by living donors—
the distinction between pre- and postmortem litigation goes without mention in the Restatement. See 
id.  
 138. On the delivery requirement for writings declaring gifts of personal property, see BROWN, 
supra note 91, § 7.10, at 110; HYLAND, supra note 93, ¶ 893. On waiver of the delivery requirement 
where intent to make a gift is assured, the one case on point cited in the Restatement involved a suit on 
an undelivered gift that followed the death of the donor. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 reporter’s note 21 (citing Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185 (1875)). 
The hypothetical illustrating the Restatement rule on waiver of the delivery requirement, see id. § 6.2 
illus. 25, appears loosely based on another old case, Grangiac v. Arden, 10 Johns. 293, 293–94, 296 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813), although it goes uncited in the Restatement. In that case as well, the litigation 
followed the death of the donor. Id. 
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III. ANTICIPATORY TRANSFERS  
The mirror image of a spot transfer is one that parties render legally 
operative in advance of its maturity. A transferor may preconceive a 
planned transfer—or an inevitable one—and seek to formalize it long 
before the transferor intends it to become possessory. Nowadays, of 
course, that is the standard practice for making a will. The transferor 
executes the will at an early or middle age, anticipating by years or even 
decades the time when the transfer eventually, but ineluctably, comes to 
fruition. 
Here, the evidentiary problems so easily dismissed in connection with 
most spot transfers grow more formidable. An extended period of latency 
raises the specter that the star witness in any trial over a transfer’s 
authenticity, finality, terms, or construction will prove unavailable to 
testify. When a transferor schedules a transfer to occur at death, his or her 
disappearance becomes a condition precedent, and not merely a risk. 
Under these circumstances, we need some substitute for the transferor’s 
testimony. And note well: this problem crops up in connection with every 
conceivable sort of anticipatory transfer, not just with regard to wills.  
A. Wills 
Lawmakers demand greater formalities for a will than apply either to 
garden-variety gifts or contracts. State statutes of wills require testators to 
commit their wills to writing.
139
 And (with an intriguing exception in some 
states that we shall address presently
140
), the statutes require testators to 
execute their wills in front of witnesses.
141
  
The writing and witnessing requirements for wills serve as substitutes 
for the testator’s testimony. Witnesses alone could not do the job; if a 
testator verbally declared his or her will years before it matured, 
witnesses’ recollections in old age of what a testator had (or had not) said 
might have dimmed, and in any event a will’s complexities might tax 
anyone’s memory. At the same time, a writing without witnesses would 
 
 
 139. But compare the exceptions addressed below in Part IV.B. 
 140. See infra text accompanying notes 152–55. 
 141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 (1998). The 
practice of witnessing wills originated in the ancient world. See In re Zaiac’s Will, 295 N.Y.S. 286, 
293–94 (Sur. Ct. 1937) (remarking a witnessed will dating to the reign of Amenemhat III in Egypt, c. 
2000 B.C.). For a comparative anthology exploring will formalities in other nations, see 
COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION LAW: VOLUME I: TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES (Kenneth G.C. Reid et 
al. eds., 2011).  
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suffer from its own deficiencies. The authenticity of the document could 
be called into question. And, with no ceremony surrounding the 
document’s execution, fact finders could not know for sure whether the 
testator considered the document as final and legally operative, as opposed 
to merely a preliminary draft.
142
 Like trusts, wills are not traditionally 
made on holidays—hence, no natural solemnity attaches to the words of 
wills.
143
 
Even so, the statute-of-wills formalities are not fool-proof. Over a 
protracted space of time, a written will can become lost. By the same 
token, witnesses may vanish, or they may perish. Historically, lawmakers 
have not required both, or even either, to survive. If necessary, 
beneficiaries can prove a lost will with other evidence, and they can also 
substitute other evidence for unavailable witnesses.
144
 Yet, lawmakers 
could easily enough impose a regime of formalizing rules designed more 
stringently to protect against the loss of documents and witnesses. 
Testators could be obliged to file a will with the probate court for 
safekeeping, for example—now merely an option made available to 
testators in many states.
145
  
 
 
 142. In four jurisdictions, however, probate can occur during the lifetime of the testator. See 
ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.555 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-40-202 to -203 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 30.1-08.1-01 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.081 to -.084 (West Supp. 2013). In 
that event, the testator is available to testify, and formalities of will execution become unnecessary—
or, we might say, the probate proceeding itself serves to furnish the ritual, guard the evidence, and 
protect the testator, which the formalities of will execution out of court otherwise function to do. The 
statutes permitting antemortem probate do not technically waive any of the formalities of will 
execution, however.  
 143. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 119, 129 and infra text accompanying note 285. 
 144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. k; 
3 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 27.2 to -.3, 29.11, 29.156 to -.161 (William J. Bowe & Douglas H. 
Parker eds., rev. ed. 2005, & Jeffrey A. Schoenblum ed., Supp. 2012) [hereinafter PAGE]; see also, 
e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-402(a), 3-405 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 83, 91 (2013) (allowing 
probate of lost wills and permitting “other evidence or affidavit” as a substitute for unavailable 
witnesses). Some states demand a higher standard or special types of proof for lost wills, however. See, 
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.207 (West 2010) (requiring testimony of disinterested witnesses). For a 
recent case holding that a will could be admitted to probate, despite the fact that both witnesses 
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and refused to testify, see In re Estate 
of Buchting, 975 N.Y.S.2d 794, 797 (App. Div. 2013) (observing that “no negative inference may be 
drawn from such an invocation”).  
 145. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-515 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 234 (2013); TEX. EST. 
CODE ANN. §§ 252.001 to -.153 (West 2014). The practice has deep roots, although the institution 
charged with this responsibility has evolved. In ancient Rome, the Vestal Virgins undertook the 
function of safekeeping wills. MOSES A. DROPSIE, THE ROMAN LAW OF TESTAMENTS, CODICILS, AND 
GIFTS IN THE EVENT OF DEATH (MORTIS CAUSA DONATIONES) 23 (1892); see also MICHAEL GRANT, 
CLEOPATRA 192–93 (1972) (discussing the will of Mark Antony, which Octavian—the future 
Augustus Caesar—stole from the Virgins and publicized during Antony’s lifetime).  
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Lawmakers could also enact a statute of limitations for the probate of 
wills, as applies to many other sorts of claims. Statutes of limitations 
operate to protect against the risks of adjudicative error that arise when 
parties postpone a cause of action until a time when “evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared,” as Justice 
Jackson once put the matter generally.
146
 In fact, many states have adopted 
such a rule for wills. Under the Uniform Probate Code, beneficiaries can 
submit a will for probate only within three years of the testator’s death; 
otherwise, they can only petition for intestacy.
147
 States that have adopted 
statutes of limitations for wills have invariably structured them in this 
way, although the period of time within which probate of a will must 
occur varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction—in one state, the deadline is 
so strict as to require probate within six months of the date of death.
148
 
That lawmakers have chosen to start the clock on the date of death is 
understandable. Statutes of limitations for other causes of action—breach 
of contract, for instance—begin to run when the claim arises. Modern 
statutes of limitations for wills conform to this pattern.
149
 The difference, 
though, is that little time typically separates contract formation from 
breach, making them functionally simultaneous events. Not so in the case 
of wills; will execution and maturity are, in all probability, distinct events. 
The quality of the evidence of a will’s authenticity hinges on when it was 
executed, not on when the testator died. Authenticating a half-century old 
will that parties promptly submit for probate represents a far thornier task 
than authenticating one executed shortly before death, even if beneficiaries 
delay probate for a number of years. Under late Roman law, wills became 
ineffective if they failed to take effect within ten years of their 
execution.
150
 Some sort of similar rule, making execution the trigger for a 
statute of limitations, and hence requiring periodic re-execution of wills, 
would better suit the purpose of ensuring a will’s evidentiary integrity, 
although such an innovation (its radicalness aside
151
) would add to the 
transaction cost of will making. 
 
 
 146. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). 
 147. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-108(a)(5) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 40 (2013). 
 148. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-617, 59-619 (2005).  
 149. But cf. infra notes 266, 273, 287 and accompanying text. 
 150. THE THEODOSIAN CODE § 4.4.6, at 84 (Clyde Pharr trans., 1952) (418 A.D.). This limit 
disappeared under Justinian’s Code of 529 A.D. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 206 (Thomas Collett 
Sandars ed. & trans., 7th ed., photo. reprint 1970) (1922) [hereinafter INSTITUTES].  
 151. The costs of effecting the legal transition would greatly diminish the practicality of this sort 
of statute of limitations. See supra note 30. 
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An exception to the witnessing requirement appears in the twenty-
seven states that allow holographic wills in lieu of executed ones.
152
 In 
these states, if a testator writes out the substantive provisions of a will in 
longhand and signs the document, it can be probated even without 
witnesses. In concept, holographic wills function to simplify, and to 
cheapen, the process of will execution without sacrificing evidentiary 
integrity. Here, witnesses become unnecessary as a means of 
authentication “by virtue of the recognized difficulty of forging an entire 
handwritten instrument,”153 as opposed to a mere signature. At the same 
time, holographic wills can present courts with other evidentiary 
challenges. In the absence of professional drafting and standardization, 
these lay documents often require construction proceedings to clarify their 
meaning. And in the absence of a ritual will execution ceremony, much 
litigation has also revolved around whether an alleged holographic will 
was intended to be a final, legally operative document.
154
 
Yet, in the twenty-first century, all of this may be about to change. 
Once upon a time, people corresponded by posted letter, often written out 
longhand. Expert witnesses could compare the handwriting found in a 
holographic will with other documents shown to have been penned in the 
testator’s hand. In an age of e-mail and telephonic texting, however, the 
handwriting that appears in a holograph could lose its probative value—
the testator might leave behind few other samples of his or her 
handwriting with which the holograph can be compared. Meanwhile, 
ironically, the very emergence of this problem could ease the second 
evidentiary task of establishing the finality of a holograph. When 
handwritten documents turn into anachronisms, they could take on a ritual 
value that they lacked heretofore. A will laboriously drawn out in 
longhand could then become as exceptional as an executed will. In short, 
technological and social change could well stand the evidentiary attributes 
of holographic wills on their head. 
At any rate, holographic wills are probably doomed to extinction in this 
century for another reason: most Americans will lose the ability to 
handwrite documents altogether. In the wake of modern information 
 
 
 152. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(b) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013). The 
statutes are tabulated in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 3.2 statutory note (1998); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-502(b) (West 2012) 
(enacted after the Restatement was published). On the history of holographic will statutes, see Hirsch, 
supra note 42, at 1071–73. 
 153. Bouch v. Rombotis (In re Estate of Black), 641 P.2d 754, 756 (Cal. 1982). 
 154. For a discussion and further references, see Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1073–78. For more 
recent scholarly treatments and assessments pro and con, see supra note 26.  
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technology, schools in the United States no longer make more than a token 
effort to teach cursive handwriting, and it is fast becoming a lost art.
155
 
Today’s rising generation is destined to regard holographic wills as a 
historical curiosity. 
When testators fail to formalize their wills properly, a court may still 
have power to give effect to them in many states today under either of two 
remedial doctrines. In some jurisdictions, the judicially-developed 
substantial compliance doctrine allows courts to waive minor, technical 
failures to comply with the statute of wills.
156
 In several other jurisdictions, 
a statutory harmless error power grants courts leave to waive failures of 
formality altogether, where parties can produce clear and convincing 
evidence of donative intent.
157
 (The Restatement endorses the harmless 
error power but, in a bizarre oversight, fails to identify it as an exclusively 
statutory doctrine.
158
) Nevertheless, a fair number of states continue to 
 
 
 155. For a discussion of the declining use, and reduced teaching, of cursive handwriting, noting 
the heightened risk of forgery that has resulted, see Katie Zezima, Can You Read This? It’s Cursive, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at A15.  
 156. For a recent example, see In re Succession of Arceneaux, No. 2012 CA 1624, 2013 WL 
2393093, at **2–5 (La. Ct. App. May 31, 2013). For earlier case law, see 2 PAGE, supra note 144, 
§ 19.4, at 14–15.  
 157. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 215 (2013). This statutory 
power is broader than the judicial substantial compliance doctrine. See, e.g., Kirkeby v. Covenant 
House (In re Estate of Kirkeby), 970 P.2d 241, 247 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (observing that “‘substantial 
compliance’ does not mean noncompliance”); Draper v. Pauley, 480 S.E.2d 495, 496 (Va. 1997) 
(requiring “rigid” conformity with the substantial compliance standard) (quoting Robinson v. Ward, 
387 S.E.2d 735, 738 (Va. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); Brown v. Fluharty, 748 S.E.2d 
809, 813 (W. Va. 2013) (“This Court cannot find substantial compliance . . . where there was no 
compliance whatsoever.”) (citation omitted). Still, the harmless error power does not allow courts to 
give effect to a will that a testator neglected to put in writing (viz., oral or “nuncupative” wills), 
discussed below in Part IV.B. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 215 
(2013) (“Although a document . . . was not executed in compliance with [the statute of wills]. . . .”) 
(emphasis added). Query whether this restriction is appropriate for a harmless error doctrine, given 
that courts have authority to probate lost wills. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. Thus far, 
only six states have enacted the harmless error doctrine as set out in the Uniform Probate Code. HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-503 (Lexis Nexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2503 (West 2000); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 29A-2-503 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (West 1993). Four additional states have enacted 
more limited versions of the harmless error doctrine that differ only marginally from a codified 
substantial compliance doctrine. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 15-11-503 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (West 2008); VA. CODE § 64.2-404 
(2004). When Massachusetts adopted the Uniform Probate Code in 2012, the state pointedly omitted 
the harmless error doctrine from its omnibus enactment. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-
503 (West 2012).  
 158. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 & cmt. 
b (1998); but cf. id. § 3.3 reporter’s note 2 (quoting, and asserting that the Restatement (Third) “carries 
forward the position taken in” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 33.1 
cmt. g (1992), which had noted the distinction between a judicial substantial compliance doctrine and a 
statutory harmless error doctrine). Restatements ordinarily promulgate model judicial rules; on those 
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acknowledge neither power,
159
 and the virtues of introducing one remain 
controversial. The harmless error power might tend to encourage 
carelessness and breed litigation, or open up avenues for fraud.
160
 At any 
 
 
occasions when Restatements speak to statutory rules, they expressly recognize them as such. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 2 introductory note, 
§§ 2.2, 3.1 & cmt. f; see also Lawrence W. Waggoner, Why I Do Law Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 727, 733–34 (2012) (observing that “[i]n some cases, when the UPC adopted specific rules 
whose implementation seemed beyond the power of the courts and achievable only by statute, I did not 
think that the Restatement could follow suit, even though I favored the UPC position on the merits,” 
speaking in his capacity as Reporter for the Restatement (Third)). The Restatement (Third) analogizes 
a harmless error doctrine for wills to a similar doctrine in the law of gifts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. yy (“By analogy to those authorities 
. . . .”); see also supra notes 132, 137 and accompanying text. Yet, as a matter of legal process, there is 
a world of difference between a judicial doctrine creating a right to waive formal requirements 
established by the common law under the law of gifts, and one creating a right to waive formal 
requirements established by a statute under the law of wills. If the Restatement (Third) actually intends 
to advocate a judicial harmless error doctrine for wills, going beyond the substantial compliance 
doctrine, then the Restatement (Third) is jurisprudentially unsound. See Litevich v. Probate Court, No. 
NNHCV126031579S, 2013 WL 2945055, at *20–22 (Conn. Super. Ct. May, 17, 2013) (rejecting a 
party’s request that the court establish the harmless error doctrine as a “judicial gloss” on the statute of 
wills, observing that “[i]t is not for this court to decide to adopt a substantial abrogation of an 
unambiguous statute”); Brown, 748 S.E.2d at 813 (finding invalid a will that did not comply 
substantially with the statute of wills, on the ground that “[t]o hold otherwise would require us not to 
construe the statute but to disregard it”); see also John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the 
Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 6 (1987) (“The substantial compliance doctrine is the only avenue open to the courts without 
legislative intervention.”); cf. Waggoner, supra, at 735 n.38 (misdescribing a Canadian case, Sisson v. 
Park St. Baptist Church, 24 E.T.R.2d 18, 18–22 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1998), as having “adopt[ed] the 
harmless error rule judicially,” when in fact the court in Sisson adopted the substantial compliance 
doctrine judicially). 
 159. See, e.g., In re Estate of Henneghan, 45 A.3d 684, 686–87 (D.C. 2012); In re Estate of 
Chastain, 401 S.W.3d 612, 619–20 (Tenn. 2012); see also In re Estate of Holmes, 101 So. 3d 1150, 
1152–54 (Miss. 2012) (invalidating a will as improperly formalized over a dissent, without stating 
whether the court required strict or substantial compliance with the statutory formalities). For earlier 
case law, see 2 PAGE, supra note 144, § 19.4, at 15–16. 
 160. For an early warning of the risks of “tolerating departures from strict statutory requirements” 
for wills, see In re Jacoby’s Estate, 42 A. 1026, 1035–36 (Pa. 1899). In the leading case endorsing 
substantial compliance, the court anxiously added an apostrophe to attorneys: “A careful practitioner 
will still observe the formalities surrounding the execution of wills. . . . Our adoption of the doctrine of 
substantial compliance should not be construed as an invitation either to carelessness or chicanery.” In 
re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1345 (N.J. 1991). For a defense of the harmless error doctrine by 
its foremost advocate, see Langbein, supra note 158, at 3–7, 37–41, 51–54. For other discussions and 
criticisms, see Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2341748; Adam J. Hirsch & Gregory 
Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 ILL. L. REV. 557, 589-94; Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1067 n.33; 
Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
855, 877–82 (2012); Leslie, supra note 33, at 279–90; Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to 
Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577 (2007); C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and 
Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and 
the Movement Toward Amorphism (pt. 2), 43 FLA. L. REV. 599, 704–12 (1991); John V. Orth, Wills 
Act Formalities: How Much Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 73 (2008); Emily 
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rate, if lawmakers create such a power, it should with equal logic apply to 
other sorts of transfers,
161
 as Jeremy Bentham once proposed in a critique 
of English formalizing rules overlooked by modern scholars.
162
 
In sum, the formalizing rules for wills respond, at least in a rough-and-
ready way, to the situational challenges posed.
163
 Whether they respond 
optimally is difficult to judge, for we must weigh the benefits of 
formalities against the costs they impose on testators. Viewed broadly, 
writing and witnessing appear logical requirements when a transfer 
becomes anticipatory. The fact that lawmakers require neither to comprise 
an element of proof for a will if it happens to become lost, or if witnesses 
disappear, or (in some jurisdictions) if a testator bungled the will 
execution process, hardly justifies scrapping the formal requirements a 
priori.
164
 
 
 
Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a Compromise 
Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 458–76 (2002). 
 161. Although courts often strain to avoid strict enforcement of the statute of frauds, see 2 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 96, § 6.1, at 107, few acknowledge a substantial compliance doctrine for the 
statute, and no state has enacted a harmless error doctrine generally applicable to the statute. See Real 
Flo Props. v. Kelly, No. L-99-1099, 1999 WL 1203751, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1999) 
(following a substantial compliance standard for real estate contracts); Shimko v. Marks, 632 N.E.2d 
990, 992 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (same); see also supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting 
curative statutes for certain violations of the statute of frauds as applicable to transfers of real estate); 
cf. Smith v. Smith, 466 So. 2d 922, 924 (Ala. 1985) (“The prescriptions of the statute of frauds . . . are 
not to be denied or evaded.”) (quoting Smith v. E. Ala. Nat’l Bank, 128 So. 600, 601 (Ala. 1930)); 
Mut. Dev. Corp. v. Ward Fisher & Co., 47 A.3d 319, 324 (R.I. 2012) (similar statement). In 
advocating a substantial compliance doctrine for wills, Professor Langbein asserts that courts already 
apply, with respect to the statute of frauds, a “purposive approach to formal defects . . . . when the 
purposes of the formal requirements are proved to have been served,” by virtue of the part 
performance and main purpose rules. Langbein, supra note 22, at 498–99. Yet, both of those doctrines 
comprise limited exceptions—neither operates across the board. For discussions of the two doctrines, 
see 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 96, §§ 6.3., at 123–28, 6.9. The U.C.C. simultaneously prunes back 
the part performance doctrine and adds another confined, purposive exception to the formal 
requirements. See U.C.C. § 2-201(2), (3)(c) (amended 2010). 
 162. See BENTHAM, supra note 66, at 512–51. Bentham urged that violations of formalizing rules 
for contracts and wills alike should trigger “suspicion” of the transfer, rather than nullify the transfer. 
Id. at 517–21, 523–25, 532–35, 541.  
 163. One widely ignored situational variable, however, is the testator’s physical or educational 
ability to read his or her will. Only one state today establishes special rules for formalizing the will of 
a blind or illiterate testator, in order to forestall fraud. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1579 (1997). This 
doctrinal exception has ancient roots. See INSTITUTES, supra note 150, at 180 (setting distinct 
formalizing rules for the wills of blind testators under the Code of Justinian). The Uniform Probate 
Code ignores this variable. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 
(2013). State statutes of frauds applicable to gifts and contracts likewise disregard this variable, 
although in connection with spot transfers—in contradistinction to wills—the blind or illiterate 
transferor is able to testify as to what he or she intended a document to provide.  
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 144, 156–57. For a recent case rejecting a constitutional 
challenge to existing will formalities as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, see Livetich v. 
Probate Court, No. NNHCV126031579S, 2013 WL 2945055, at *11–20 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 17, 
2013). For another recent case upholding the constitutionality of a state statute barring holographic 
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B. Gifts 
A donor might also frame an anticipatory transfer as a gift, that is, a 
gift scheduled to come into the donee’s possession in futuro. Wherein lies 
the difference? Wills take effect only at death, not at other predetermined 
times, and wills are also ambulatory—they remain revocable by the 
testator, whereas gifts once made become final. The donor cannot rescind 
a gift.
165
 
We may note, preliminarily, that not all anticipatory gifts are allowed 
as a matter of substantive law. What is worse, the characteristics 
distinguishing valid gifts from invalid ones are subtle, not to say confused. 
On the one hand, a gift of a specific, existing tangible or intangible asset 
with delivery delayed until some future time (viz., a future interest) is 
permissible and enforceable if, and only if, the donor intends to convey a 
present and irrevocable right to future enjoyment.
166
 Likewise, a donor can 
give away ex ante property that he or she does not yet possess, but which 
the donor is due to receive by virtue of a vested or contingent future 
interest created by a third party.
167
 
On the other hand, a pledge to make a gift of a specified asset, or of a 
general sum, at a future time fails as a (mere) donative promise, ordinarily 
unenforceable at common law.
168
 For the same reason, the present “gift” of 
 
 
wills but certifying the question to the state supreme court, see Lee v. Estate of Paine, No. 2D12-4411, 
2013 WL 5225200, at **4–5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Sep. 18, 2013). For a recent proposal to offer an alternative 
means of formalizing wills, see Reid K. Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of 
Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877 (2012) (proposing to attach optional statutory will forms to state 
income tax returns). For a criticism of another novel means of formalizing wills, so far valid in only 
one state, see Scott S. Boddery, Electronic Wills: Drawing a Line in the Sand Against Their Validity, 
47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 197 (2012). For earlier discussions and proposals, see Baron, supra 
note 31, at 198–99 (suggesting the relaxation of formalizing rules applicable to wills as well as gifts); 
Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1069 n.38 (citing to other analyses).  
 165. BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.13, at 119; see, e.g., In re Estate of Monks, 655 N.Y.S.2d 296, 
298–99 (Sur. Ct. 1997). Under early Anglo-Saxon law, gifts delayed until death (which Professor 
Maitland designated “post obit gifts”) often took the place of wills, which lacked full effectiveness 
prior to the ninth century. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 316–17 (2d ed. 1899); Harold D. Hazeltine, General 
Preface to ANGLO-SAXON WILLS, at vii-ix (Dorothy Whitelock ed. & trans., 1930). In feudal times, 
English law did an about-face: wills became effective and delayed gifts became ineffective. 2 
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra, at 318–36.  
 166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 6.1 cmt. f 
(2003); BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.12; see also, e.g., Puetz v. First Nat’l Bank of Skokie (In re Estate 
of Puetz), 521 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 872–74 (N.Y. 
1986); Neuschafer v. McHale, 709 P.2d 734, 739 (Or. Ct. App. 1985). 
 167. E.g., Speelman v. Pascal, 178 N.E.2d 723, 725–26 (N.Y. 1961).  
 168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. p; see, 
e.g., Hocks v. Jeremiah, 759 P.2d 312, 315 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). For exceptions that may apply under 
state law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
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forgiveness of a debt owed in the future, known technically as a release, 
also fails at common law.
169
 Likewise, an anticipatory gift of an 
expectancy―that is, of property in which the testator owns no existing 
future interest, but which he or she might acquire later from some 
identified source—is ineffective, even if the donor wishes to convey 
irrevocably his or her rights that may later materialize.
170
 Hence, for 
example, the present gift of any bequest the donor might receive under a 
living person’s will is invalid.171 But at the same time, and with no 
apparent appreciation of the inconsistency, the common law (overruled by 
statutory law in some states) gives effect to anticipatory disclaimers of an 
inheritance from a living person’s will.172 In such a case, the disclaimant 
does not choose the alternative taker of the expectancy, as a donor would, 
but the disclaimant nonetheless, by consulting the will, can determine who 
the alternative taker would be.
173
 Hence, a disclaimer represents a form of 
gratuitous transfer, here treated differently as a matter of substantive law.  
Meanwhile, contract law draws none of the nice distinctions that have 
evolved within the law of gratuitous transfers. Contracts for the sale of 
future interests, for the release of debts, for the transfer of expectancies, 
and for the execution of anticipatory disclaimers are all either effective at 
common law or (alternatively) enforceable in equity, sometimes with an 
added stipulation that they are valid if made for a fair consideration.
174
  
 
 
 169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 273, 284 (noting the effectiveness of 
releases under some circumstances, and under some state statutes); 13 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 67.10 
(Sarah H. Jenkins ed., rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter CORBIN]. At the same time, debts can be released 
under wills. 6 PAGE, supra note 144, § 57.1. 
 170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. f. 
 171. E.g., Mastin v. Marlow, 65 N.C. 695, 703 (1871). 
 172. See, e.g., In re Estate of Heffner, 503 N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (Sur. Ct. 1986) (holding an 
anticipatory disclaimer valid at common law); In re Estate of Boren, 268 S.W.3d 841, 848–51 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2008) (observing in dicta that an anticipatory disclaimer would have been effective had it 
been properly filed). But cf. In re Estate of Baird, 933 P.2d 1031, 1033–35 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) 
(holding an anticipatory disclaimer invalid under the text of the state’s disclaimer statute). The 
Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act (incorporated into the Uniform Probate Code) is 
ambiguous on this point. It allows a beneficiary to disclaim “any interest in or power over property.” 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1105(a) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 390 (2013). This definition appears 
to exclude an expectancy: “By all traditional and current concepts of property, expectancies are not 
property interests.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 41 cmt. a (2003). Nevertheless, the Uniform 
Disclaimer of Property Interests Act creates a filing procedure for anticipatory disclaimers. UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2-1112 (e)(3), (f) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 404 (2013).  
 173. On this feature of disclaimers, see Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 587, 608 (1989). 
 174. See, e.g., Greene v. Rosin (In re Rosin), 248 B.R. 625, 633–34 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) 
(giving effect to the assignment of an heir’s expectancy “provided the assignment was fairly obtained 
and based on sufficient consideration”); Rector v. Tatham, 196 P.3d 364, 367–69 (Kan. 2008) (same); 
Johnson ex rel. Lackey v. Schick, 882 P.2d 1059, 1060–62 (Okla. 1994) (same); Scott v. First Nat’l 
Bank of Baltimore, 168 A.2d 349, 351 (Md. 1961) (same); Badouh v. Hale, 22 S.W.3d 392, 396 (Tex. 
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No announced policy explains these distinctions. Volumes of the 
Restatement set out the rules but fail to articulate a rationale for any of 
them.
175
 Professor Allan Farnsworth suggests that the doctrines derive, 
implicitly and unsystematically, from lawmakers’ paternalistic instincts: 
“It is an appealing notion that we are more competent in ordering our 
present actions than our future ones,” Farnsworth posits; “[i]f . . . we are 
less able to protect ourselves against the possibility of ‘second thoughts’ in 
cases of promises to make gifts than in cases of present gifts, paternalism 
may seem more justifiable in cases of promises.”176  
Of course, the problem of paternalism in law—here, hard paternalism, 
not merely the soft variety reflected in Fuller’s cautionary function of 
formalities
177—and the extent to which civil government can legitimately 
protect persons from their own misjudgments is a large subject.
178
 What 
makes Farnsworth’s analysis noteworthy is his projection of the problem 
from the transactional realm into the world of gratuity—from buyer’s 
remorse to donor’s remorse. It is a natural extension. Either variant of 
regret can stem from the tendency of persons to trade present for future 
utility, a phenomenon which the psychologists call myopia, and the 
economists (who sometimes venture the same ideas but speak a different 
language) usually style as hyperbolic discounting. We often indulge our 
present selves by overspending or overborrowing for current consumption. 
By the same token, when we care about others and have interdependent 
utilities with them (translating once more into the economists’ obscure 
 
 
2000) (enforcing the assignment by preventing the assignor from executing a disclaimer). For a case 
enforcing a contractual pooling of expectancies, see Ferguson v. Carnes, 38 FLA. L. WEEKLY D741, 
2013 WL 1316345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). For cases giving effect to contractual, anticipatory 
disclaimers, see for example McCarthy v. McCarthy, 133 N.E.2d 763, 767–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) and 
Stewart v. McDade, 124 S.E.2d 822, 825–27 (N.C. 1962). For contractual releases, for which there 
appear few if any cases on point, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 273(a); 13 CORBIN, 
supra note 169, § 67.10, at 100–01. 
 175. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 2.6 cmt. j, 
6.1 cmts. f & p, 6.2 cmt. w; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 41 & cmts. a–d. The Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts offers one truism that hardly passes for a policy: “By all traditional and current 
concepts of property, expectancies are not property interests.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 41 
cmt. a. For an early discussion of the distinction between a promise to make a future gift and a gift of a 
future interest, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 194 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1982) (1651). 
 176. E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises and Paternalism, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 398 (2000). 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 18–20. 
 178. For recent, scattered contributions to the debate, see PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism, 64 FLA. 
L. REV. 721 (2012); Tom Ginsburg et al., Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary 
Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 291 (2014); Jayson L. Lusk et al., The Paternalist Meets His Match, 36 
APPLIED ECON. PERSP. & POL’Y 61 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral 
Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826 (2013). 
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dialect), we might similarly incline toward overgenerosity, either with 
what we have now or will (or might) acquire later on, again at the cost of 
our own future welfare.
179
  
If that were their focus of concern, though, lawmakers have at their 
disposal a less invasive solution to the problem. Lawmakers could 
accommodate the remorseful donor by rendering anticipatory gifts 
voidable until they become possessory, rather than wholly void. By 
making anticipatory gifts (be they future interests, expectancies, or 
promises) mandatorily revocable, lawmakers could avoid regret and also 
give effect to gifts of future assets by those who never experience regret, 
but who die before the assets change hands.
180
 Lawmakers have employed 
similar expedients within the other primary categories of transfer. In the 
realm of contracts, mandatory cooling-off periods sometimes operate to 
protect parties from failures of judgment.
181
 By even closer analogy, wills 
making future transfers also function in this way. Bequests under wills are 
revocable and cannot be made irrevocable, which is why the cautionary 
function of formality applies just indirectly to wills.
182
 Only if they are not 
revoked during the testator’s lifetime do wills become effective. 
Anticipatory gifts could be treated in like manner. Oddly, though, under 
 
 
 179. Farnsworth’s intuition that it is easier (or too easy) to give away future, as opposed to 
present, assets, see supra text accompanying note 176, might also implicate another psychological 
phenomenon known as the endowment effect: Some evidence suggests that persons tend subjectively 
to value property that they own above its objective worth. But preliminary evidence also suggests that 
the endowment effect does not come into play until property becomes possessory:  
The impression gained from informal pilot experiments is that the act of giving the participant 
physical possession of the good results in a more consistent endowment effect. Assigning 
subjects a chance to receive a good, or a property right to a good to be received at a later time, 
seemed to produce weaker effects.  
Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. 
POL. ECON. 1325, 1342 n.7 (1990). If that is true, then donors’ rights to future interests and 
expectancies may hold less subjective value, making them readier objects of donors’ generosity, or 
overgenerosity. At the same time, recent experimental studies have called into question the endowment 
effect. For a review, see Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental 
Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2, 30–53 (2013). 
 180. For a proposal to make gift promises effective so long as they are not repudiated, see Mary 
Louise Fellows, Donative Promises Redux, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 27, 33–37 
(Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988). For a proposal to offer all donors of inter vivos gifts 
(not confined to anticipatory ones) the option of making their gifts revocable, see John L. Garvey, 
Revocable Gifts of Personal Property: A Possible Will Substitute, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 119 (1966).  
 181. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 786–97 
(1983). 
 182. See Hoffman v. Krueger (In re Salzwedel’s Estate), 177 N.W. 586, 587–88 (Wis. 1920) 
(holding ineffective as “purely testamentary” an attempted inter vivos transfer of a future interest in 
“all our personal property which we may possess at our death”). If the cautionary function applies to 
wills, it does so only because procrastination and transaction costs impede their amendment. Cf. supra 
text accompanying notes 18–20. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/1
  
 
 
 
 
2014] FORMALIZING GRATUITOUS & CONTRACTUAL TRANSFERS 835 
 
 
 
 
current law the opposite is true: all valid anticipatory gifts are irrevocable 
and cannot be made revocable.
183
 
In point of fact, litigation over anticipatory gifts has arisen almost 
invariably in instances where death arrives before possession, and where 
there is no evidence that the donors ever wished to retract their gifts.
184
 
Paternalistic considerations fail to figure into such cases. 
But there remains another element to consider here. If a hiatus 
separates the time when a gift is created and the time when it becomes 
possessory, then the risk arises that the donor will not live long enough to 
substantiate his or her intent to make a gift at all. The longer the delay, the 
greater the risk; and if a gift is timed to take effect only upon the donor’s 
death, then the risk grows to a certainty. Here, witnesses (to ensure 
authenticity) and a writing (to protect against lapses of memory) would 
both serve evidentiary needs presented by the circumstances. Notice in this 
regard that if lawmakers were to change the law of gifts to make 
anticipatory gifts revocable, then an anticipatory gift programmed to take 
effect upon the donor’s death would become indistinguishable from a will, 
which of course requires full execution under the statute of wills.
185
 Yet, 
the feature of revocability—or irrevocability—has no impact whatsoever 
upon a fact finder’s ability to recover evidence of a given gratuitous 
transfer. 
Under current law, anticipatory gifts are formalized like any other gift: 
all they require is delivery. Because manual delivery of an abstract future 
right is impossible, a donor must instead deliver a written description of 
the gift to the donee.
186
 Given the donor’s possible (or certain) 
unavailability to testify, a writing provides a fact finder with valuable 
evidence—it is better than nothing.187 Nonetheless, the writing in question 
 
 
 183. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. That is not true of trusts, however, which a 
settlor can make revocable. See infra Part V. 
 184. See, e.g., Unthank v. Rippstein, 386 S.W.2d 134, 134–35 (Tex. 1964) (concerning an 
ostensible, anticipatory gift of a five-year income stream made three days before the donor’s death).  
 185. See supra Part III.A. 
 186. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 6.2 cmts. 
g, h, t & w (2003); see also, e.g., Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 874 (N.Y. 1986); In re Estate of 
Monks, 655 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299–300 (Sur. Ct. 1997). 
 187. See Gruen, 496 N.E.2d at 874 (observing that, in the absence of witnesses, a written 
instrument provides better evidence of an anticipatory gift than a ritual of manual delivery of the gift 
corpus to the donee followed by its immediate return to the donor would provide); see also Rogers v. 
Rogers, 319 A.2d 119, 121 (Md. 1974) (recognizing the risk of fraud where an alleged donee claimed 
to have made a bailment of the gift corpus back to an alleged donor and then sued for the return of the 
corpus after the donor’s death).  
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need not be witnessed, nor even signed by the donor.
188
 We cannot dismiss 
the danger of fraud in such cases. 
In short, evidentiary concerns bulk as large if not larger than 
paternalistic ones in connection with anticipatory gifts. But, once again, 
we can answer those concerns with small difficulty. Lawmakers could 
validate anticipatory gifts of all sorts (including ones now held ineffective) 
but require donors to formalize them exactly like wills. 
Such an approach would hardly appear revolutionary. We need not dip 
too far back into the past to encounter historical precedents. At least one 
early court ruled that a charitable subscription—a form of gift promise that 
is enforceable in some states
189—if postponed until death must be 
executed in conformity with the statute of wills, because “the gift . . . is 
testamentary in its character.”190 In former times, a donor could make 
other gift promises, or a gift of an expectancy—transfers that today are 
ineffective—valid and enforceable by recourse to the seal. A promise 
under seal involved a writing, delivery, and in lieu of witnesses a waxen 
image of the donor’s signet ring, which was difficult to counterfeit.191 
These formalities bore some resemblance to those demanded by the statute 
of wills. By the dawn of the twentieth century, though, the seal had 
deteriorated into a standard wafer or form, more susceptible to fraud, and 
it was applied pro forma by parties, losing its ritual significance.
192
 
 
 
 188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 32.1 (1992) (requiring that 
the document, if unsigned, merely be “identified in some way as coming from the donor”); BROWN, 
supra note 91, § 7.10, at 109–110. The third Restatement adds a signature requirement. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. s. Nevertheless, as the reporter 
concedes, there are contrary precedents. Id. § 6.2 reporter’s note 18. 
 189. The Restatement endorses the doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) 
(1981). 
 190. Am. Univ. v. Conover, 180 A. 830, 832 (N.J. 1935). The charitable subscription at issue had 
been “duly signed and witnessed,” but apparently not in compliance with the statute of wills. Id. at 
831. The court acknowledged that its ruling conflicted with prior decisions from other jurisdictions. Id. 
 191. Under the French Civil Code, a gift promise must be notarized, and hence in effect 
witnessed, to become enforceable, although in practice today parties often circumvent this 
requirement. See JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW 
COMPARED 68–69, 82 (1980). 
 192. Professor Williston made the point in defense of the Uniform Written Obligations Act of 
1925, for which he had served as Reporter: “[W]hen a man has signed a document, a gratuitous 
promise, and given it to another, it is pretty easy for that other to lick a wafer and put it after the 
signature. That’s a fraud that might be difficult to prove.” Uniform Written Obligations Act, 
Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole, reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL 
MEETING 193, 197 (1925); see also UNIF. WRITTEN OBLIGATIONS ACT cmt., reprinted in id. at 584, 
585. This Act required donors to certify a gift promise by including an express statement that they 
intended to be legally bound to carry out the promise. The only formal requirements specified in the 
Act were a writing and a signature by the donor. Id. § 1. The sufficiency of this procedure is open to 
doubt. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.  
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Legislation abolishing the seal soon spread among the states to the point 
where the seal today has virtually disappeared as a legal formality.
193
 With 
its demise has gone the opportunity to make anticipatory gifts that are 
more rigorously formalized than ordinary gifts. Hence, in structural terms, 
the demise of the seal also sealed the end of a situational exception from 
the formalizing rules for gifts in favor of categorical homogeneity. 
C. Contracts 
Although most contracts have short life spans, that is not invariably 
true. Some “relational” contracts continue to bind parties over longer 
terms. Others call for delayed performance, or performance at death—
often taking the form of “contracts to make wills.” These may require 
payment under the will for some service performed inter vivos, or they 
may comprise agreements not to revoke reciprocal wills under which the 
parties provide either for each other, or for the same third-party 
beneficiaries, or both.  
At several levels, though, the notion of a contract to make a will 
appears misguided, at least as currently conceived and applied. Considered 
in the abstract, the very idea of a will contract—a bound gratuity—appears 
oxymoronic. Suppose, by analogy, a party were to agree to perform some 
service in contractual exchange for a gift of a sum certain. Any court 
would view this nuance as a solecism: in truth, the contract would 
exchange a service for the transfer of a sum certain. Courts ought likewise 
to view contracts to make wills as agreements to make a transfer at the 
indeterminate moment of a party’s death. Some contracts do take that 
form expressly, although they turn up less frequently in the law reports.
194
 
By conceiving of will contracts as agreements performed literally by acts 
of testation, courts have sometimes gone astray, penalizing parties for 
breaches that are in truth illusory (or, even within the traditional 
framework of contract law, not material).
195
  
 
 
 193. For a thorough discussion of promises under seal and a proposal for their revival in a new, 
fraud-resistant form, see Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise Under Seal as a Legal 
Formality, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 617 (1993). 
 194. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 195. See, e.g., In re Estate of Cohen, 629 N.E.2d 1356, 1357–60 (N.Y. 1994) (finding that where 
two spouses entered into a contract not to revoke their wills bequeathing to each other for life, with a 
remainder to members of each of their families, and where the husband (who died first) revoked his 
will by implication of its disappearance, in violation of the contract, the wife was thereby freed to 
bequeath to whomever she liked, despite the fact that she still inherited her husband’s estate by 
intestacy, instead of by the contractual will).  
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At the same time, for reasons that for too long have gone unexplained, 
most courts hold that a will contract remains unenforceable until one side 
has performed. If one party repudiates the contract, the other party cannot 
sue for the benefit of the bargain. Rather, the other party mitigates by not 
performing in turn, and mitigation is conclusively presumed to be 
complete.
196
  
In other words, on reflection, a so-called contract to make a will fails to 
function as a true contract at all. Rather than create an executory contract, 
the parties’ agreement gives rise to a compound of two unilateral contract 
offers. Only after one side accepts by performing, thereby producing an 
executed contract, does the other side become bound.
197
 
Despite this distinction of substantive doctrine, the formalizing rules 
for contracts to make wills coincided historically with those that applied to 
other contracts. Hence, parties could create a contract to make a will by 
mere parol agreement, unless the subject matter of the contract brought it 
within the statute of frauds.
198
 Yet, notice the special circumstances that 
prevail here: The parties to the contract typically will be laypersons, not 
business persons. The contract is not formed in a typical business 
environment, and the parties may have a poorer understanding of what 
their declarations connote to one another. Here, a legal ritual indicating 
finality holds greater value than it would for professional contractors.
199
 
Such a contract may also take effect long after the parties strike their 
bargain. What is more, no cause of action on the contract typically arises 
until after one party to the contract has died; only then does a will that 
might breach the contract become operative.
200
 Indeed, if the contract 
takes the common form of mutual promises not to revoke a will, and one 
 
 
 196. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION 
AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 4.9, at 247–48 (4th ed. 2010); 1 PAGE, supra note 144, § 10.2; cf. BERTEL 
M. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS: LEGAL RELATIONS ARISING OUT OF CONTRACTS TO 
DEVISE OR BEQUEATH 110–23 (1956) (asserting that most statements of this rule comprise dicta). 
Professor McGovern and his collaborators speculate: “[B]ecause contracts to make wills are usually 
between family members, courts may feel that the parties did not intend them to be enforceable to the 
same extent as a commercial contract.” MCGOVERN ET AL., supra, § 4.9, at 248. 
 197. In this respect, contracts to make wills operate today in most states in the same way that 
ordinary business contracts did prior to the seventeenth century, when only executed contracts were 
enforceable. For a discussion of the history, see 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 96, § 1.6. 
 198. See, e.g., Dean v. Morris, 756 S.E.2d 430, 432–33 (Va. 2014). For discussions of the case 
law applying the statute of frauds to will contracts, see THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF WILLS § 48, at 213–15 (2d ed. 1953); MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 196, § 4.9, at 245–47; 1 
PAGE, supra note 144, § 10.11; SPARKS, supra note 196, at 39–49; Merrill I. Schnebly, Contracts to 
Make Testamentary Dispositions as Affected by the Statute of Frauds, 24 MICH. L. REV. 749 (1926). 
 199. See supra text accompanying notes 82–83. 
 200. 1 PAGE, supra note 144, § 10.38, at 554–55. 
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party dies in compliance with the promise, no suit will become possible 
until both parties have died; only at the death of the second party might a 
breach occur allowing third-party beneficiaries to sue on the contract. 
Once again, the value of a writing, and of witnesses to verify its 
authenticity, stands out in this context.
201
 
Of course, the general idea that prolonged or delayed agreements 
require extraordinary evidence already informs contract law. The statute of 
frauds includes a provision premised on this notion, however poorly the 
provision achieves its end.
202
 Famously, the statute of frauds requires 
parties to commit to writing any contract that cannot be performed within 
one year.
203
 Because the moment when a living party will die is 
indeterminate, and could be immediate, contracts to make wills fail to 
come within the statute’s purview.204 In twenty-three states today, parties 
can continue to formalize a will contract with nothing more than an 
exchange of oral declarations, offering and accepting the terms of the 
agreement.
205
 
 
 
 201. The problem has aroused surprisingly little discussion by commentators. For a brief early 
appraisal, criticizing the enforcement of oral contracts to make wills as failing to appreciate “the sound 
policy” of the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills, see Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law, 
1918–1919: Equity (pt. 3), 33 HARV. L. REV. 929, 933–34 (1920). For an incisive judicial analysis 
drawing the same conclusion, and analogizing will contracts to wills, see Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 
113 N.E.2d 424, 427–28 (N.Y. 1953). See also Orlando v. Prewett, 705 P.2d 593, 598 (Mont. 1985) 
(expressing suspicion of oral contracts to make wills, and citing prior opinions in accord); Fahringer v. 
Estate of Strine, 216 A.2d 82, 85 (Pa. 1966) (same); 1 PAGE, supra note 144, § 10.10, at 481–82 
(advocating legislation to invalidate oral contracts to make wills). By comparison, Professor Fratcher 
emphasized the importance of the cautionary function in connection with will contracts: 
Contracts affecting succession are rarely desirable as estate planning devices and they are 
likely to cause much suffering if entered into without competent advice as to their effects. 
Consequently, it seems desirable to impose [formal] requirements upon the making of such 
contracts that are so difficult that they cannot be met without the advice of counsel. 
William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1081 (1966) 
(footnotes omitted). Offering still another perspective, Professor Sparks perceived a tension between 
the situational argument that “every kind of transaction which is intended to affect the distribution of a 
decedent’s property at death should be evidenced by a writing” and the particular circumstance that 
“contracts to make wills are likely to involve family matters not often reduced to writing and . . . if 
enforcement is denied great inequity will result.” SPARKS, supra note 196, at 48. 
 202. “The design was said to be not to trust to the memory of witnesses for a longer time than one 
year, but the statutory language was not appropriate to carry out that purpose.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt. a (1981); see also id. ch. 5 statutory note. Commentators have 
agreed with that assessment. See, e.g., 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 96, § 6.4.  
 203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130(1). 
 204. 1 PAGE, supra note 144, § 10.11, at 482–83; SPARKS, supra note 196, at 40; see, e.g., 
Appleby v. Noble, 124 A. 717, 718 (Conn. 1924); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 130 cmt. a (“Contracts of uncertain duration are simply excluded; the [statute of frauds] covers only 
those contracts whose performance cannot possibly be completed within a year.”). 
 205. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. In California, this rule is codified. CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 21700(a)(4) (West 2011). In Iowa, only some will contracts can be created by oral declaration. 
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The remaining twenty-seven states have enacted formalizing rules for 
contracts to make wills, either grafted into the statute of frauds or set out 
in a freestanding statute.
206
 But only one state today takes cognizance of 
the situational similarity to testation by requiring parties to execute will 
contracts in the same manner as wills.
207
 Three other states require either a 
signed writing or a mere writing, without the need for witnesses.
208
 In two 
states, contradictory statutes have left the formalizing rules for will 
contracts ambiguous.
209
 Finally, under the Uniform Probate Code’s 
provision, codified in twenty-one states, parties who wish to formalize a 
will contract have several options: (1) the testator can recite the contract 
within the terms of his or her will, (2) the parties can formalize the 
contract in a writing signed by the decedent, or (3) the testator can refer 
within the four walls of his or her will to a parol agreement (or to an 
unsigned writing).
210
  
The Uniform Law Commissioners aver that “[t]he purpose of this 
section is to tighten the methods by which contracts concerning succession 
may be proved.”211 Yet, the options presented here add up to a curious 
hodgepodge. If the contract is embedded in an executed will, then we have 
a ceremony demonstrating finality, durable evidence of content, and 
protection against fraud. If the contract appears in a signed writing that 
remains unwitnessed, we continue to have durable evidence of content, but 
our assurance of finality and authenticity becomes shakier, given either or 
both parties’ unavailability to corroborate the agreement. And if a will 
 
 
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.270 (West 1992). No statute on point appears in Conn., Del., Haw., Ill., 
Ind., Kan., La., Md., Miss., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., Okla., R.I., Vt., Va., Wash., W. Va., or Wyo. 
In seven of these states, however, dead man’s statutes may apply to will contracts: Ind., Md., N.Y., 
N.C., Vt., Wash., and W. Va. See infra notes 296–300 and accompanying text. 
 206. These states are Alaska, Ala., Ariz., Ark., Colo., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ky., Me., Mass., Mich., 
Minn., Mo., Neb., N.M., N.D., Ohio, Or., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Va., and Wis. In addition, 
one discrete type of will contract requires formalization in Iowa. See infra note 207.  
 207. That state is Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.701 (West 2010); cf. IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 633.270 (requiring contracts not to revoke reciprocal wills to be expressly stated within those wills, a 
formalizing rule that does not apply to other will contracts); Zajec v. Beaver (In re Estate of Beaver), 
206 N.W.2d 692, 698–99 (Iowa 1973) (giving effect to a will contract formalized by parol agreement). 
Until 2003, Texas validated only those will contracts set out within the four walls of a will. TEX. PROB. 
CODE § 59A (amended 2003).  
 208. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-30 (2012) (requiring a signature); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2107.04 (West Supp. 2012) (same); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 254.004(a) (West 2014) (superseding 
the Tex. Prob. Code in 2014) (lacking a signature requirement). 
 209. See infra notes 227–28. 
 210. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-514 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 233 (2013). This provision is 
reproduced in Ala., Ark., Colo., Idaho, Ky., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.M., N.D., 
Or., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, and Wis. See also infra notes 227–28 (indicating that Alaska & Ariz. 
may also fall into this category).  
 211. Id. § 2-514 cmt. 
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makes reference to a parol agreement, we forfeit even our confidence that 
the substance of what was said can be reconstructed accurately. 
If some principle guided this (seemingly) desultory gathering of 
alternative formalizing rules, the Commissioners fail to disclose its 
contours.
212
 The last option resembles the doctrine of incorporation by 
reference, whereby a will can validly refer (and thereby give effect) to 
extrinsic material—except that the material a testator can incorporate by 
reference is confined traditionally to writings.
213
 “The possibility of fraud 
or error would be too strong” if the doctrine covered oral declarations, 
Judge Cardozo opined,
214
 adding that “[e]ven in courts where 
incorporation is permitted more liberally than it is with us [in New York], 
the reference must be to a document or something equivalent thereto.”215 
By nevertheless permitting parties to incorporate by reference a parol 
agreement to make a will, the Commissioners again raise the specter of 
“fraud or error”216 when the terms of the contract are established post 
mortem, possibly from memory. 
Even if fact finders could accurately reconstruct an agreement, the 
parties’ intent to make it legally operative might remain uncertain in 
connection with this formalizing option. Under the doctrine of 
incorporation by reference, codified elsewhere in the Uniform Probate 
Code, an extrinsic writing referred to in a will takes effect only if the 
writing predates the will.
217
 This requirement ensures the finality of the 
document to which the will refers. By comparison, the Uniform Probate 
Code’s provision for formalizing will contracts fails to include this caveat. 
On a textualist reading, the provision allows a testator to anticipate and 
validate a contract to make a will that he or she might agree to 
subsequently.
218
 Given that possibility, fact finders could not even rest 
assured that the testator intended a subsequent conversation that he or she 
 
 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. § 2-510 & cmt. (codifying a simplified version of the common-law doctrine); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.6 cmt. a (1998). 
 214. In re Rausch’s Will, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (N.Y. 1932). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. See supra text accompanying note 214. 
 217. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-510 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 228 (2013) (allowing a 
will to incorporate by reference “[a] writing in existence when a will is executed”); cf. id. § 2-513 , 8 
pt.1 U.L.A. 231 (2013) (allowing a will to incorporate by reference a subsequent writing, but only for 
the purpose of disposing of tangible personal property, apparently on the assumption that it is typically 
of small value); Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1106 n.142 (discussing the legislative history of this 
provision); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6132(g) (West 2009) (adding an express value limitation to this 
provision). 
 218. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-514, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 233 (2013) (allowing a will to make “an 
express reference . . . to a contract,” without qualification). 
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had about a will contract to bind him or her—and, unlike the usual state-
of-affairs for contracts, the testator is unavailable to testify as to whether 
he or she possessed such an intent. 
An early draft of the Uniform Probate Code had included a provision 
requiring parties to formalize all will contracts “in the manner hereinafter 
prescribed for the execution of attested written wills.”219 This language 
disappeared from subsequent drafts.
220
 None of the contemporary drafting 
commentary explains why the provision was dropped. 
In other respects, the final language of the Uniform Probate Code’s 
provision covering will contracts is found wanting. This freestanding 
provision creates ambiguities by failing to explicate its relationship to the 
separate statute of frauds in effect within a state.
221
 Whether circumstances 
excusing a failure to meet the formal requirements of the statute of frauds 
apply by analogy to the Code’s provision on will contracts remains unclear 
and has generated conflicting opinions.
222
 Whether the Code’s provision 
supplements or supersedes the requirements of the statute of frauds as it 
might limit by subject matter the formalizing options for a will contract is 
likewise left up in the air; this issue has yet to arise in a published case.
223
  
 
 
 219. Unif. Probate Code, pt. 2, § 234 (Reporter’s Draft No. 1, August, 1966). This draft provision 
corresponds with the rule currently found in Florida. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.  
 220. See Unif. Probate Code, § 2-701 (Summer 1967 Draft, July 14, 1967). 
 221. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-514 & cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 233 (2013) 
(making no reference to the statute of frauds). 
 222. For example, in some situations part performance can render an oral contract—including an 
oral will contract—enforceable where the statute of frauds would otherwise invalidate the agreement. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 129 & illus. 10 (1981). For a judicial recognition of 
the doctrinal conflict over whether this and other excusatory doctrines extend to the Code’s provision, 
see Brody v. Bock, 897 P.2d 769, 774 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (citing to prior case law). For a 
discussion of the case law, see MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 196, § 4.9, at 246; see also Erwin v. 
Wanda E. Wise Revocable Trust, No. 12CA3501, 2013 WL 1091229, at *3–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 4, 
2013) (construing as not subject to the part performance doctrine or other excusatory doctrines a state 
statute setting formalizing rules for will contracts analogous to, but different from, the Code’s 
provision). 
 223. Thus, for example, if a will contract implicates a bequest of real property, could the contract 
be formalized by a reference in the will to a parol agreement, as allowed by the Code’s provision, see 
supra text accompanying note 210, despite the general requirement that all contracts for real property 
must be placed in writing, see supra text accompanying note 75, as established by the statute of 
frauds? See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 cmt. b (“[O]ne contract may be within 
more than one clause of the statute [of frauds], and facts which except it from one class may not except 
it from another.”); Moore v. Schwartz (In re Estate of Moore), 669 P.2d 609, 612 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1983) (characterizing Arizona’s enactment of the Code’s provision as “a ‘mini-statute of frauds’”). But 
cf. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (asserting generally that “[w]here 
there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general 
one, regardless of the priority of enactment”) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 
(1974)). 
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What is more, the Uniform Probate Code’s provision is framed too 
narrowly. It covers only a “[a]contract to make a will or devise,”224 not a 
contract to make a posthumous transfer generally. A contractual obligation 
to make a payment upon death per se, rather than by will, does not fall 
under the Code’s formalization requirements, by its plain language. 
Hence, for example, a contract to provide a party with a home for the rest 
of his life in exchange for the sum of $7,000 upon completion of the 
contract, as found in one case,
225
 need not be formalized under the Code’s 
provision for will contracts, at least on a textualist reading of the 
provision.
226
 At the same time (and reinforcing this point of construction), 
some states have crafted statutory language that is more broadly applicable 
to the situation at hand. Under Arizona’s statute of frauds, “an agreement 
which by its terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the 
promisor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any property, or to make 
provision for any person by will,” must be committed to writing and 
signed by the charged party.
227
 This language covers the field of 
anticipatory contracts in a way that the Uniform Probate Code does not. 
Among the fifty states, only Alaska has a similarly inclusive statute of 
frauds,
228
 whereas Pennsylvania achieves the same result by expanding the 
scope of its statute covering will contracts—based on the Uniform Probate 
 
 
 224. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-514 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 233 (2013). 
 225. Hagan v. McNary, 148 P. 937, 937 (Cal. 1915). See also, e.g., Gold v. Killeen, 33 P.2d 595, 
595–96, 598 (Ariz. 1934) (concerning a contract for services with payment due “at the time of . . . 
death”); Dailey v. Adams, 319 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Ark. 1959) (amended decision) (concerning a contract 
for post mortem care of pet animal, with compensation “paid out of my estate”); Roy v. Salisbury, 130 
P.2d 706, 707–10 (Cal. 1942) (similar contract); Patterson v. Chapman, 176 P. 37, 37–38 (Cal. 1918) 
(en banc) (per curiam) (concerning a contract with payment due post mortem from assets “which I 
may own at the time of my death”). 
 226. But see Scottrade, Inc. v. Davenport, 873 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1320 (D. Mont. 2012) 
(construing the Code’s provision purposively to cover contracts to give property at death by means 
other than a will, because “the public policy behind the statute is to discourage false post-mortem 
claims based upon oral promises. . . . If the distinction proposed . . . were applicable, the statute [as 
enacted in Montana] could be easily evaded by unscrupulous claimants . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 227. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101(8) (2003) (emphasis added). Arizona’s formalizing rule for 
will contracts (but not for other obligations payable at death) remains ambiguous, because Arizona has 
also adopted a second, contradictory statute confined to will contracts, based on the Uniform Probate 
Code. Cf. id. § 14-2514 (2005). Case law in Arizona assumes that the Code’s provision applies to will 
contracts, but without identifying and addressing the statutory conflict. See Lockett v. Lockett (In re 
Estate of Lockett), No. 1CA–CV 10–0812, 2012 WL 1468602, at *3–4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2012); 
Gonzalez v. Satrustegui, 870 P.2d 1188, 1195 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Moore, 669 P.2d at 611–12 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1983) (observing only that “the wording of” Arizona’s statute based on the Code is “similar 
to Arizona’s general contract statute of frauds”).  
 228. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(a)(2) (2012). Like Arizona, Alaska has adopted a second, 
contradictory statute based on the Uniform Probate Code. Cf. id. § 13.12.514. As in Arizona, case law 
assumes that this second statute governs will contracts without noticing or addressing the conflict. See 
Cragle v. Gray, 206 P.3d 446, 451 (Alaska 2009). 
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Code, and imposing the same amalgam of formalizing rules found there—
to cover also “an obligation dischargeable only at or after death.”229 Three 
other states (California, Hawaii, and New York) which require a signed 
writing for any contract not to be performed during the promisor’s lifetime 
have each repealed provisions that had extended this requirement to 
contracts to make wills.
230
 In these states, the text of the applicable 
formalizing rule is precisely opposed to the one established under the 
Uniform Probate Code, which applies to contractual wills but not to other 
contracts that operate post mortem.
231
 
The textual history of these statutes suggests that lawmakers conceive 
of contractual wills and contracts for posthumous transfers as raising two 
distinct problems. From a situational perspective, though, the problems are 
indistinguishable—and even as a matter of substance, the distinction 
between them appears theoretically suspect, as earlier explained.
232
 For the 
Uniform Law Commissioners, in turn, to limit their special formalizing 
rule to will contracts is to perpetuate this pointless and artificial 
distinction. Why they have chosen to do so is impossible to say. Perhaps 
the Commissioners assumed that their remit within the Uniform Probate 
Code begins and ends with wills. If that is so, then we must conclude that 
the Code’s dimensions are arbitrarily defined, leading in this instance to a 
jagged formalizing rule. But, in fact, no reference to, or discussion of, the 
problem appears at all within the Code or its commentary, suggesting 
another possibility—that the Commissioners failed even to appreciate that 
a contractual transfer at death might occur outside of a will, and that, as a 
consequence, the formalizing rule they crafted was underinclusive.
233
 
IV. ELEVENTH-HOUR TRANSFERS 
Still another set of background conditions for transfers changes the 
equation once again. A transferor may find cause to make a transfer by 
 
 
 229. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701(a) (West 2005).  
 230. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a)(5) (West 2011), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(6) 
(repealed 1983). By the amendment of 1983, the two clauses seen in the Arizona statute, see supra text 
accompanying note 227, were severed, and a separate section devoted exclusively to will contracts was 
added; that section has subsequently been repealed, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 150 (repealed 2000); id. 
§ 21700 (West 2011). Similar severances occurred in New York, compare N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
701(a)(1) (McKinney 2002), with N.Y. PERS. PROP. § 31(7) (repealed 1964), and in Hawaii, see HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 656-1(7) (LexisNexis 2012) (abolishing the special formalizing rule for contracts 
to make wills created after July 1, 1977, but not for other post mortem contracts). 
 231. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 194–95. 
 233. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-514 & cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 233 (2013).  
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virtue of his or her impending death. Such an eleventh-hour transfer (as we 
might call it) mixes and matches situational elements we have already 
encountered. Like an anticipatory transfer, an eleventh-hour transfer 
occurs under conditions of transferor absence, should litigation ensue. But 
this characteristic combines with promptness, like a spot transfer, in that 
an eleventh-hour transfer is destined to come to fruition in short order, 
even though it entails obligations or a change of possession scheduled to 
take place only upon the transferor’s demise.  
What formalities become expedient when we are presented with this 
blend of circumstances? For one thing, we have less need for a ritual to 
clarify finality under these conditions. The shadow of death, creating the 
urgency to get one’s affairs in order, lends natural solemnity to a transfer. 
And evidence of even a parol declaration will be fresh in mind, creating 
less need for durable evidence. At the same time, the transferor’s absence 
from any ensuing suit over a transfer makes the presence of third parties 
all the more important. And witnesses could also play a useful protective 
role in these circumstances, insulating a transferor rendered more 
vulnerable by terminal illness to undue influence or duress. 
Accordingly, we may hazard that a witnessed declaration should 
suffice to formalize transfers under these conditions. By dispensing with 
other formalities, we give transferors a greater opportunity to effectuate 
intent as they near the end of their rope. How, though, are transfers close 
unto death handled currently under the law? 
A. Gifts 
One variety of near-death transfer is the deathbed gift. Aware that they 
have no time left to enjoy their property, donors may give some or all of it 
away. Donors can thereby make last-minute amendments to their estate 
plans. And even if the recipients are the same ones who would receive 
property by intestacy, or under a will, deathbed gifts might give donors the 
satisfaction of being thanked in person. Or perhaps some donors in 
extremis seek belatedly to avoid probate. This motive appears to have 
moved at least one dying donor when she authorized a friend to withdraw 
all the money from her savings accounts “so that the lawyers would not 
get hold of it.”234  
 
 
 234. Gilman v. McArdle, 2 N.E. 464, 464 (N.Y. 1885). Avoiding probate has more recently 
become a widespread aspiration but is ordinarily achieved in other ways. See infra text accompanying 
notes 313–15.  
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Deathbed gifts can take either of two forms: an ordinary gift, or a gift 
causa mortis (which donors are rebuttably presumed to prefer).
235
 Gifts 
causa mortis differ substantively from an ordinary gift, in that they 
comprise the one type of gift that is revocable.
236
 Given this substantive 
difference, much of the litigation over gifts causa mortis revolves around 
the nature or extent of the hazard required to trigger the categorical 
exception—for example, whether a donor can make a revocable gift in 
anticipation of a self-created peril (viz. a planned suicide),
237
 and whether 
the peril has to exist objectively, as opposed to one blown out of 
proportion by the donor’s fears or phobias.238  
Because they are revocable and take effect on the brink of death, gifts 
causa mortis are frequently compared to wills.
239
 The resemblance has 
moved courts to import other substantive rules of testation into the law of 
gifts causa mortis.
240
 Nevertheless, as a matter of formality, courts draw no 
distinction between an ordinary gift, an ordinary gift on the deathbed, and 
a gift causa mortis. All three merely require delivery; no third party need 
witness delivery.
241
 At the eleventh hour, though, the risk of fraud rises by 
an order of magnitude; given the owner’s infirmity, the ostensible donee 
might take possession of the property without permission, and the owner 
 
 
 235. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. zz 
(2003); BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.15, at 131. 
 236. Cases diverge over whether gifts causa mortis are automatically revoked if the donor survives 
the life-threatening hazard, or whether they remain revocable within a reasonable time thereafter. 
According to one commentator, the first view “represents the weight of authority.” BROWN, supra note 
91, § 7.19, at 141; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 
cmt. zz (taking the second view). 
 237. See ANDREW BORKOWSKI, DEATHBED GIFTS: THE LAW OF DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA 50–51 
(1999); BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.18, at 139 n.12; see also, e.g., Smith v. Sandt (In re Estate of 
Smith), 694 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); id. at 1103–06 (Cirillo, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (debating the issue). For a further discussion, see Adam J. MacLeod, A Gift Worth Dying 
for?: Debating the Volitional Nature of Suicide in the Law of Personal Property, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 93 
(2008). 
 238. See BORKOWSKI, supra note 237, at 47–48; BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.18, at 138; see also, 
e.g., Welton v. Gallagher, 630 P.2d 1077, 1083 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981); Gonzales v. Zerda, 802 S.W.2d 
794, 795–96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).  
 239. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 
cmt. zz (“The gift causa mortis resembles a testamentary disposition. . . . ”). See also BORKOWSKI, 
supra note 237, at 25–26 (citing to discussions of the resemblance in British case law); infra notes 246, 
257. 
 240. By analogy to a will beneficiary, the donee of a gift causa mortis must survive the donor in 
order to keep the gift. See BORKOWSKI, supra note 237, at 31, 60; BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.19, at 
143. Case law conflicts on whether an express provision in a will can override a gift causa mortis, as a 
codicil could override a will. See BORKOWSKI, supra note 237, at 60–61; BROWN, supra note 91, § 
7.19, at 143. 
 241. E.g., Ostheimer v. McNutt (In re Collinson’s Estate), 93 N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ind. App. Ct. 
1950) (en banc). See also BORKOWSKI, supra note 237, at 39–43. 
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may have no opportunity to report the theft before being overtaken by 
death.
242
 By the same token, when meeting with a dying owner in private, 
an ostensible donee can exercise undue influence or duress without 
restraint. Courts appreciate the dangers, and have voiced their unease for 
well over a century,
243
 but the rule stands unchanged. 
Possibly with these risks in mind, courts have limited the effectiveness 
of gifts causa mortis by subject matter and by type of delivery. Gifts causa 
mortis in land are traditionally deemed invalid, and some courts also hold 
that gifts causa mortis cannot be effected by delivery of a writing—thus 
hindering transfers of personal property not immediately available for 
manual delivery by the donor.
244
 Such limitations hardly serve even to 
narrow the problem, for a donor in extremis remains free to make 
ordinary, irrevocable gifts of land or of other property via delivery of an 
unwitnessed writing.
245
 From a situational perspective, however, 
irrevocable gifts on the deathbed and gifts causa mortis raise identical 
concerns. 
Long ago apprehending the situational ambiguity of gifts causa mortis, 
the Roman jurists guided their formalization more adroitly: Under the 
Code of Justinian, gifts causa mortis required multiple witnesses.
246
 
 
 
 242. For an allegation that baseball legend Joe DiMaggio was victimized in this way by his 
longtime attorney, who was observed wearing DiMaggio’s world series ring at his funeral, see 
RICHARD BEN CRAMER, JOE DIMAGGIO: THE HERO’S LIFE 508–11 (2000). The attorney, however, is 
reported to have claimed that the ring was either a deathbed gift or a bailment that he later returned to 
DiMaggio’s estate. Id. at 511; MORRIS ENGELBERG & MARV SCHNEIDER, DIMAGGIO: SETTING THE 
RECORD STRAIGHT 383–84 (2003); Bill Egbert, DiMaggio Lawyer Swings Back, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
Oct. 16, 2000, at 5, available at 2000 WLNR 9573737. 
 243. See, e.g., Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 326–27 (1868); Smith v. Commerce Trust Co. (In 
re Estate of Simms), 423 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Mo. 1968); Parker v. Copland, 64 A. 129, 131 (N.J. 1906); 
Devlin v. Greenwich Sav. Bank, 26 N.E. 744, 744 (N.Y. 1891); Walsh v. Sexton, 55 Barb. 251, 256 
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1869); Renee v. Sanders, 131 N.E.2d 846, 855–56 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956); Fouts v. 
Nance, 155 P. 610, 612–13 (Okla. 1916) (quoting Keepers v. Fid. Title & Deposit Co., 28 A. 585, 587 
(N.J. 1894)); Bessett v. Huson (In re Estate of Bessett), 39 P.3d 220, 222 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Smith, 
694 A.2d at 1105 (Cirillo, J., concurring and dissenting).  
 244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. zz 
(noting the traditional restrictions but allowing gifts causa mortis of personal property delivered by a 
writing); ATKINSON, supra note 198, § 45, at 201–04; BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.16. But see Sen v. 
Headley, [1991] Ch. 425 (C.A.) (holding valid a gift causa mortis in land). In some jurisdictions, if the 
subject matter of a gift is already in the hands of a bailee, an effective gift causa mortis to the bailee 
still requires manual redelivery, unlike an ordinary gift. BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.8, at 102, cf. supra 
note 124 and accompanying text.  
 245. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. zz 
(rebuttably presuming that a gift of personal property delivered by a writing while the donor is in 
extremis is intended to be irrevocable, contrary to the usual presumption for deathbed gifts; see supra 
note 235 and accompanying text). 
 246. INSTITUTES, supra note 150, at 148. Whereas a gift causa mortis required five witnesses, a 
will (written or unwritten) required seven. Id., at 148, 167, 172. “It was much doubted by the jurists 
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Today, only six American jurisdictions treat gifts causa mortis by statute, 
and three of them establish no statutory formalizing rule,
247
 while a fourth 
expressly codifies the common law.
248
 But in two other states, lawmakers 
have pointed the way toward reform in this area of the law. Under a statute 
in Georgia, a gift causa mortis requires delivery in the presence of at least 
one witness.
249
 Gifts causa mortis are confined in Georgia to personal 
property, but the donor can deliver them “symbolic[ally],” making 
alternatives to manual delivery possible.
250
 At the same time, the statute 
explicitly covers only revocable gifts, not ones intended to be 
irrevocable,
251
 even though they share the same situational characteristics. 
By contrast, the statute in New Hampshire applies to a “gift [made] in 
expectation of death, often called donatio causa mortis,” without expressly 
confining the act’s reach to revocable gifts.252 Under this statute, the donor 
must manually deliver the gift in the presence of at least two disinterested 
witnesses, and the donee must prove the gift upon a petition filed within 
sixty days of the donor’s death—presumably to ensure that the witnesses 
testify while their memories are fresh.
253
 This provision (along with 
Georgia’s) deserves a hearing in other states. 
B. Wills 
Wills, too, may be executed near death. In the Middle Ages, testators 
typically made their wills as part of the last confession.
254
 Today, testators 
rarely wait until the eleventh hour to execute their wills, although some 
 
 
whether [gifts causa mortis] ought to be considered as a gift or as a legacy. . . . We have decided . . . 
that they shall be in almost every respect reckoned amongst legacies, and shall be made in accordance 
with the forms our constitution provides.” Id. at 147–48. 
 247. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-3-201 to -205 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN §§ 47-11-09 
to -13 (West 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-36-4 to -8 (2004). 
 248. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 5701 (West 2009) (applying to the subject “the general law relating 
to gifts of personal property”); see also id. §§ 5702–5705. 
 249. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-100 (a)(4) & (a)(5) (2012). 
 250. Id. §§ 44-5-100 (a)(1) & (a)(4). The statute fails to define “symbolic delivery,” but it could 
include delivery of a written description of the gift. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 6.2 cmts. g–h (2003); BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.5, at 92.  
 251. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-100 (a)(3) (2012) (limiting the statute to “gift[s] intended to be 
absolute only in the event of death”). 
 252. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:17 (2007). 
 253. Id. 
 254. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 165, at 318–20, 340. For American colonial practice, 
see George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the American Colonies, 51 YALE 
L.J. 1280, 1289 (1942). 
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procrastinators rush to do so only after they fall seriously ill.
255
 A trickle of 
such cases continues to appear in the law reports.
256
 
As already noted, wills functionally resemble gifts causa mortis, and 
that is especially true of deathbed wills.
257
 Both occur under the same 
conditions and, within a situational theory of formalizing rules, both raise 
the same concerns. Again, the importance of witnesses looms, given the 
inability of decedent testators to take the witness stand themselves. At the 
same time, the need for written evidence diminishes, given the brevity of 
the interlude between the time when the will is executed and the time 
when it matures.  
Nevertheless, few jurisdictions today subdivide the formal 
requirements for wills on this basis. Just as they have amalgamated the 
formalizing rules for gifts causa mortis with ordinary gifts, so have 
lawmakers in most states consolidated wills causa mortis (so to speak) 
with ordinary wills. This consolidation cuts two ways. On the one hand, 
lawmakers fail to relax the writing requirement for wills made in extremis, 
even though preservation of their terms becomes less crucial in these 
circumstances. And on the other hand, lawmakers fail to stiffen the formal 
requirements for a holographic will made in extremis, in jurisdictions that 
permit them, despite the greater need for someone to witness the making 
of the will, in order to protect testators rendered vulnerable to external 
pressures in these circumstances. 
Historically, the first special provisions for wills made in extremis trace 
to the English statute of frauds, enacted in 1677. Prior to that date, 
testators could make wills confined to personal property by oral 
declaration (known as “nuncupative” wills), whereas wills devising real 
property had to be written.
258
 The English statute of frauds continued the 
subject-matter division but added formalities to each category: for the first 
time, wills disposing of personal property now also required a writing, 
 
 
 255. For empirical evidence of the decline of deathbed will execution, a trend that appears to have 
played out over an extended period of time, see Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of 
Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 611 n.3 (2009). 
 256. See, e.g., Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 96 P.3d 623, 625–26 (Idaho 2004) (concerning a will 
executed two days before the testator died); Estate of Dellinger v. 1st Source Bank, 793 N.E.2d 1041, 
1042 (Ind. 2003) (concerning a will executed one day before the testator died); In re Estate of 
Robinson, 477 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (App. Div. 1984) (concerning a will executed thirty-two minutes 
before the testator died, subsequently challenged for lack of testamentary capacity). 
 257. For judicial recognitions, see for example, Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns. 502, 513–14 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1822) (Chancellor Kent) and Lewis v. Aylott, 45 Tex. 190, 199 (1876). See also James 
Schouler, Oral Wills and Death-bed Gifts, 2 L.Q. REV. 444 (1886); supra note 239. 
 258. Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, § 1 (Eng.); see also HENRY SWINBURNE, A BRIEFE 
TREATISE OF TESTATMENTS AND LAST WILLES pt. 1, §§ 12, 14, pt. 4, § 26 (photo. reprint 1978) 
(1590). 
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whereas those devising real property had to be signed by the testator and 
attested in the presence of three witnesses.
259
 But, in addition, the statute 
carved out a third category, covering wills “made in the time of the last 
sicknesse of the deceased.”260 A testator could continue to make a 
nuncupative will under these conditions, but only if he or she met a host of 
other requirements: (1) the property disposed of under the will could not 
include realty,
261
 (2) the testator had to “bid the persons present or some of 
them beare wittnesse that such was his Will,”262 known technically as the 
rogatio testium, similar to the requirement found in some states that a 
testator “publish” a written will by declaring to witnesses the nature of the 
document,
263
 (3) three witnesses had to be present at the making of the will 
(the “nuncupation”),264 (4) the nuncupation had to occur in the testator’s 
dwelling or place of residence for the previous ten days, unless the testator 
was “surprised or taken sick being [away] from his owne home and dyed 
before [returning there],”265 (5) probate had to follow within six months of 
the nuncupation, unless the witnesses committed the substance of the will 
to writing within six days,
266
 and (6) no nuncupative will could supersede 
a preexisting written will.
267
 Still another provision permitted any 
“[s]oldier being in actuall Military Service, or any Marriner or Seaman 
being at Sea” to dispose of personal property “as he . . . [might] have done 
before the making of this Act”—language effectively allowing servicemen 
to make nuncupative wills without any of these limitations, albeit under 
conditions of continual risk to their lives.
268
 
 
 
 259. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §§ 5, 18 (Eng.). 
 260. Id. § 18.  
 261. Id. § 5. 
 262. Id. § 18. 
 263. For a recent discussion of the formality of publication, see Brown v. Traylor, 210 S.W.3d 
648, 663–66 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). Once a common requirement, see ATKINSON, supra note 198, § 68, 
the formality of publication has disappeared from most state statutes of wills. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. h (1998). 
 264. Statute of Frauds § 18. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. § 19. But neither could probate proceed within the first fourteen days after the testator’s 
death, nor without notice to the surviving spouse and “kindred to the deceased, to the end they may 
contest the [nuncupative will] if they please.” Id. § 20. 
 267. Id. § 21. For an early criticism of the requirements for nuncupative wills set out in the 
English statute of frauds, see BENTHAM, supra note 66, at 545–47. 
 268. Statute of Frauds § 22. The exception has ancient origins. See INSTITUTES, supra note 150, at 
173-77. See also Thomas E. Atkinson, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Wills, 28 A.B.A. J. 753 (1942). For 
judicial discussions, see In re Knight’s Estate, 93 A.2d 359, 362 (N.J. 1952) (linking the exception to 
“the stress and danger of [the soldier’s] situation, which may well subordinate the ordinary legal 
requirements”) and In re Zaiac’s Will, 295 N.Y.S. 286, 301 (Sur. Ct. 1937) (citing similar statements 
in the case law). 
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A century and a half later, the statutory provision for nuncupative wills 
disappeared in England. Under the English wills act of 1837, only the 
exception for soldiers and sailors survived.
269
 But that space of time 
proved sufficient for the doctrine to take hold in America, still a mosaic of 
colonies in 1677, when the English statute of frauds was adopted. Many 
colonies based their own statutes of wills on this blueprint and carried 
them forward under the reception statutes that followed independence. By 
the time England abandoned the model, American states no longer looked 
to Parliament for statutory guidance, and nuncupative wills continued 
under American statutes still grounded on former English law.
270
  
As of 1960, forty-two American states warranted nuncupative wills.
271
 
Since then, however, the number has dwindled steadily. As of 2014, nine 
states permit testators to make nuncupative wills while in extremis, still 
cabined by limitations and requirements dating back to 1677.
272
 An 
additional six states authorize nuncupative wills for active military 
personnel only.
273
 The model acts have paralleled this trend: whereas the 
 
 
 269. See An Act for the Amendment of the Laws with Respect to Wills, 1837, 1 Vict., c. 26, § 11 
(Eng.).  
 270. For a further discussion of the history, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance: United States Law, 
in 3 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 325, 325–26 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 
2009).  
 271. John B. Rees, Jr., American Wills Statutes: I, 46 VA. L. REV. 613, 637–38 (1960). 
 272. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-4 (West 2010) (limiting the total value of bequests to $1,000, 
or $10,000 for military personnel, and no realty); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-608 (2012) (not limiting value 
but barring realty); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 91-5-15, 91-5-17 (2013) (neither limiting value nor barring 
realty and also allowing unwitnessed nuncupative wills if the total value of bequests is no greater than 
$100); MO. REV. ANN. STAT. § 474.340 (2012) (limiting the total value of bequests to $500 and no 
realty); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:16 (2007) (neither limiting value nor barring realty and also 
allowing unwitnessed nuncupative wills, whether or not made in the last illness, if the total value of 
bequests is no greater than $100 of personal property); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-3.5 (West 2013) 
(neither limiting value nor barring realty); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.60 (West Supp. 2013) (not 
limiting value but barring realty); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-106 (2013) (limiting the total value of 
bequests to $1,000, or $10,000 for military personnel, and no realty); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6 
(2010) (not confining nuncupative wills to the last illness, but limiting the total value of bequests to 
$200, and no realty, as construed in In re Estate of Cote, 848 A.2d 264, 266–68 (Vt. 2004)). See also 
infra notes 284, 286–87 and accompanying text. Texas was the most recent state to abolish 
nuncupative wills, as of September 1, 2007. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 65 (repealed 2007). 
 273. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.2 (McKinney 2012) (neither limiting value nor 
barring realty but validating a nuncupative will only if made by military personnel during wartime, and 
invalidating the will three years after a mariner makes it, or one year after a member of the armed 
forces leaves the service); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, §§ 46, 51 (West 2013) (limiting the total value of 
bequests to $1,000, and not barring realty, but validating a nuncupative will only if made by military 
personnel in immediate peril of death); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-6 (2011) (not limiting value but barring 
realty); VA. CODE § 64.2-408 (B) (2004) (not limiting value but barring realty); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 11.12.025 (West 2012) (limiting the total value of bequests to $1,000, and barring realty, but 
validating a nuncupative will only if made by military personnel in the last illness, submitted for 
probate no more than six months after making the will); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-5 (West 2010) (not 
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Model Probate Code of 1946 provided for nuncupative wills,
274
 the 
Uniform Probate Code of 1969 fails to allow them under any 
circumstances.
275
 Even the Code’s harmless error power, authorizing a 
court to validate a will that fails to meet one or more of the formal 
requirements if evidence of testamentary intent and content are clearly and 
convincingly proved, does not apply to the writing requirement, which the 
testator must meet in all cases.
276
  
Legislative hostility to nuncupative wills has stemmed both from 
sweeping trends and salient episodes. In the Middle Ages, when literacy 
rates remained low, a requirement that wills take written form would have 
restricted their number. By the late seventeenth century, however, 
illiteracy had become rarer in England, making the memorialization of 
wills a simpler task to accomplish.
277
 In addition, a celebrated case of a 
fraudulent nuncupative will came down in England in 1676, shortly before 
Parliament enacted the statute of frauds, underscoring to legislators the 
 
 
limiting value but barring realty). Two of the nine nuncupative will jurisdictions, see supra note 272, 
also make special provision for the wills of military personnel. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:15 (West 
2013) (not limiting value but barring realty); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7 (West 2013) (not limiting 
value but barring realty). 
 274. LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW: INCLUDING A MODEL 
PROBATE CODE § 49 (1946). 
 275. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013). A proposed 
provision for nuncupative wills appeared in an early draft of the Uniform Probate Code, see Unif. 
Probate Code, art. __ [no number], Execution of Wills, § 6 (First Tentative Draft, Aug. 2–7, 1965), but 
the provision was omitted from subsequent drafts without explanation. See Unif. Probate Code, pt. 2, 
§ 2-237, 2-237A (Reporters’ Draft No. 1, Aug., 1966). A commentary by the Reporter for the original 
version of the Uniform Probate Code suggested that he accepted contemporary criticism of oral wills, 
remarked infra text accompanying notes 280–82. See Richard V. Wellman & James W. Gordon, 
Uniformity in State Inheritance Laws: How UPC Article II Has Fared in Nine Enactments, 1976 BYU 
L. REV. 357, 381 (also suggesting that “the simplicity of UPC formalities involved in the execution of 
a will, including [a] section . . . which permits holographic wills, militate against a provision 
permitting oral wills”).  
 276. See supra note 157. In a few early instances, oral instructions for the preparation of 
improperly formalized written wills were given effect as nuncupative wills, see Offutt v. Offutt, 42 Ky. 
(3 B. Mon.) 162, 162–63 (1842); Phœbe v. Boggess, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 129, 130, 142 (1844); Mason v. 
Dunman, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 456, 456–57, 459–60 (1810), a forgotten antecedent of the harmless error 
doctrine for eleventh-hour wills. Even though the doctrine relied on a legal fiction, it appears a 
reasonable extension of the harmless error doctrine, given the special evidentiary circumstances. 
Nevertheless, other early courts rejected this practice. See Dockum v. Robinson, 26 N.H. (6 Fost.) 372, 
385–89 (1853); In re Male’s Will, 24 A. 370, 376–77 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1892); Porter’s Appeal, 10 Pa. 
254, 258–59 (1849); Miller v. Ford, 1 Tenn. App. 618, 625–26 (1925); Brown v. State, 151 P. 81, 81, 
83 (Wash. 1915).  
 277. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *500. For a judicial recognition, see Irwin v. 
Rogers, 157 P. 690, 691 (Wash. 1916) (“With the growth of learning and progress of letters, the 
necessity for nuncupative wills ceased to exist.”). 
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evidentiary hazards that attended these wills.
278
 An oblique reference to 
the case appears in the statute itself.
279
 
Those few modern commentators who have paused to reflect on 
nuncupative wills have opposed giving effect to them, irrespective of the 
circumstances. Oral wills “are subject to the frailties of oral proof”280 and 
hence are “not worth the risk they present of fraud and perjury.”281 Their 
“complete abolition would save disappointment and litigation.”282 Yet they 
do fill a niche—permitting testators to make abbreviated wills in case of 
debilitating emergency
283—and, what is more, the requirements that apply 
to nuncupative wills suit the narrow field to which these wills are 
confined, in those jurisdictions that continue to allow them. The rogatio 
testium helps to clarify the testator’s intent to make a finalized will,284 
even as the emergency itself brings natural solemnity to the proceedings—
for those with one foot in the grave must appreciate the gravity of the 
situation.
285
 The requirement that the testator make a nuncupative will in a 
 
 
 278. Cole v. Mordaunt (unreported, 1676) (described and discussed in Mathews v. Warner, 31 
Eng. Rep. 96, 100 (Ch. 1798)). “This is said to be the principal case, which gave rise to the statute of 
Frauds.” Mathews, 31 Eng. Rep. at 100 n.2. 
 279. “Nuncupative Wills[,] which have beene the occasion of much Perjury . . . .” Statute of 
Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 18 (Eng.). 
 280. ATKINSON, supra note 198, § 76, at 367; see also Thomas E. Atkinson, The Law of 
Succession, 1948 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 749, 759–60. 
 281. Verner F. Chaffin, Execution, Revocation, and Revalidation of Wills: A Critique of Existing 
Statutory Formalities, 11 GA. L. REV. 297, 329–30 (1977). 
 282. Max Rheinstein, The Model Probate Code: A Critique, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 550 (1948); 
see also Langbein, supra note 158, at 22, 52 (averring that nuncupative wills should be ineligible to 
take effect under a harmless error doctrine because “[f]ailure to give permanence to the terms of your 
will is not harmless”); cf. supra note 157. 
 283. Cases concerning nuncupative wills continue to appear on occasion, suggesting their 
continued use in jurisdictions that permit them. See, e.g., In re Will of Krantz, 520 S.E.2d 96, 97–99 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999); In re Estate of Alexander, 250 S.W.3d 461, 462–67 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008); In re 
Estate of Cote, 848 A.2d 264, 266–68 (Vt. 2004). Blackstone defended nuncupative wills “in the only 
instance where favour ought to be shewn to [them], when the testator is surprized by sudden and 
violent sickness.” 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *501. A nuncupative will represents a “special 
indulgence, as a last resort . . . which has no foundation but necessity.” Martin v. Rutt (In re Rutt’s 
Estate), 50 A. 171, 171 (Pa. 1901) (quoting the opinion below); see also, e.g., Prince v. Hazleton, 20 
Johns. 502, 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). Jeremy Bentham argued that the predicate for a nuncupative will 
needed refining: “There may be sickness . . . and yet no necessity . . . [and t]here may be necessity 
without sickness.” BENTHAM, supra note 66, at 545.  
 284. “[T]he rogatio testium, is doubtless to distinguish between a valid nuncupation and a casual 
conversation by one in his illness as to his wishes on the subject of his property . . . .” Gwin v. Wright, 
27 Tenn. (8 Hum.) 639, 646 (1848) (quoting Baker v. Dodson, 23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 342 (1843)). For 
similar observations, see, for example, Woods v Ridley, 27 Miss. 119, 146 (1854) and Dawson’s 
Appeal, 23 Wis. 69, 88–89 (1868). Among the nine, nuncupative will jurisdictions, see supra note 272, 
this requirement persists in six: Kan., Miss., N.H., N.C., Ohio, and Tenn.  
 285. This same natural solemnity, in a different context, appears to underlie the traditional rule 
crediting dying declarations, “for then the solemnity of the occasion is a good security for his speaking 
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secure location helps to protect him or her, in the one circumstance where 
the testator benefits from protection.
286
 And the requirement that witnesses 
either rapidly commit to writing the testator’s words or soon recount those 
words in open court—a traditional requirement still found in most of the 
jurisdictions that permit nuncupative wills—helps to ensure that the 
absence of a writing won’t compromise the court’s ability to reconstruct 
the substance of the estate plan.
287
 
To be sure, written evidence remains more reliable than memory. And 
the reliability of even short-term memory diminishes in proportion to the 
length of a will. Yet, the setting in which nuncupative wills are made itself 
offers some assurance of simplicity. Those who seek to verbalize their 
testamentary preferences on the cusp of death are more or less compelled 
to streamline.
288
 Although one can find among the nuncupative will cases 
instances in which the memories of auditors conflicted, those conflicts 
have been minor.
289
 In this connection, we might suggest, the rogatio 
testium serves another purpose—namely, to encourage the witnesses to 
pay attention.
290
 As everyday experience and experimental evidence 
demonstrate, we remember things more accurately when we make an 
 
 
the truth, as much so as if he were under . . . oath.” State v. Moody, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 31, 31 (1798) 
(per curiam). 
 286. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *501. See, e.g., Miller v. Ford, 1 Tenn. App. 618, 624–25 
(1925) (discussing the policy); Nowlin’s Adm’r v. Scott, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 64, 65–66 (1853) (same). 
Among the nine nuncupative will jurisdictions, see supra note 272, this requirement persists in two: 
Miss. and N.H. 
 287. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *501. See, e.g., Welling v. Owings, 9 Gill 467, 470 (Md. 
1851) (observing that the rule requiring witnesses to memorialize the terms of the will while they 
remain “fresh in their recollection” protects against “the imperfection and frailty of human memory”); 
In re Haygood’s Will, 8 S.E. 222, 223–24 (N.C. 1888) (similar observation). Among the nine 
nuncupative will jurisdictions, see supra note 272, this requirement persists in seven: Ind., Kan., Mo., 
N.H., Ohio, Tenn., and Vt.  
 288. Professor Friedman expects holographic wills to share the same natural simplicity: “It is far 
too much trouble to write a long legal document in longhand.” Friedman, supra note 22, at 354. 
 289. See, e.g., Owen’s Appeal In re Pritchard’s Will, 37 Wis. 68, 71–72 (1875). See also In re 
Will of Yarnall, 4 Rawle 46, 61, 66 (Pa. 1833) (alleging a disagreement over what the witnesses heard, 
not elaborated by the court); cf. Miller, 1 Tenn. App. at 626 (reporting a minor inconsistency in the 
testimony of witnesses as to what a testator had stated regarding his desire to make a will, but then 
adding: “It is remarkable that upon this essential question the three witnesses should give three 
different version of what was said, and illustrates clearly the danger of depending upon the memory of 
witnesses to establish an instrument that may so greatly influence the rights . . . of . . . absent parties.”).  
 290. See Andrews v. Andrews, 48 Miss. 220, 226 (1873) (“[T]he testator must also use some 
words indicating his desire or wish that those present . . . should bear witness that such was his will. 
But here . . . [t]here is nothing to show that he ever expected or wished that any one present remember 
what he had said, or should ever repeat those declarations . . . .”). See also In re Jacoby’s Estate, 42 A. 
1026, 1036 (Pa. 1899) (observing generally the danger of inattentive witnesses to nuncupative wills).  
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effort to do so than when we do not.
291
 Evolving technology has further 
eased the corroboration of nuncupative wills. When ubiquitous 
“smartphones” permit witnesses to video-record a testator’s declaration at 
the drop of a hat, the likelihood that a court will even need to rely on 
memory for evidence of the substance of an unwritten estate plan 
diminishes.
292
 All in all, courts should have small difficulty reconstructing 
nuncupative wills nowadays. 
C. Contracts  
Finally, a party may also find cause to make a contract in anticipation 
of imminent death. Although the close of one’s earthly affairs might seem 
an awkward moment to bind oneself to fresh knots of agreement, death 
itself can present parties with a need for new services. Some parties enter 
into contracts for their own burial, or for the care of their gravesites, 
preferring not to leave the choice of those arrangements to survivors.
293
 
Other parties are concerned to ensure that responsibilities they have 
shouldered during life will continue to be discharged following their 
deaths. Contracts for the post mortem care of pet animals, for example, are 
not uncommon, and—like gratuitous transfers—might be left to the last 
minute. Under the terms of such a contract, payment might come due prior 
to, at, or after death.
294
 
As a general proposition, contracts causa mortis (again speaking by 
taxonomic analogy) are treated no differently from other contracts, despite 
the special evidentiary problems that they present, unless they take the 
form of contracts to make wills.
295
 Nevertheless, historically, a rule of 
 
 
 291. For a recent study confirming the connection between attention and memory, see Betsy 
Sparrow et al., Google Effects on Memory: Cognitive Consequences of Having Information at Our 
Fingertips, 333 SCI. 776, 776–77 (2011). For earlier ones, see for example Larry L. Jacoby et al., 
Separating Conscious and Unconscious Influences of Memory: Measuring Recollection, 122 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 139 (1993) and Alan J. Parkin et al., On the Differential Nature of 
Implicit and Explicit Memory, 18 MEMORY & COGNITION 507 (1990).  
 292. Cf. Ellen-Marie Elliot, Court Grants iPhone Will, COURIER MAIL (Austl.), Nov. 8, 2013, at 
13, available at 2013 WLNR 27993854 (reporting a decision by the Supreme Court of Brisbane, 
Australia, giving effect to a will typed into an iPhone, just prior to the testator’s suicide, despite the 
will’s failure to comply with the formal requirements of the statute of wills). 
 293. See Ronald C. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The 
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. 
REV. 1783, 1837 (1996). 
 294. See Frances H. Foster, Should Pets Inherit?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 801, 831 (2011). 
 295. Parties occasionally enter into contracts to make wills on the deathbed. E.g., Seaver v. 
Ransom, 168 N.Y.S. 454, 455–57 (App. Div. 1917). Contracts to make wills, as well as contracts 
payable at death, are subject to special formalizing rules in some states. See supra text accompanying 
notes 206–10, 227–31. 
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evidence has compelled parties to eleventh-hour contracts to formalize 
them with more than just a verbal agreement. Under so-called dead man’s 
statutes, a surviving party who contracted with a deceased party was 
barred from testifying in an action brought against the deceased party’s 
estate.
296
 In practice, then, an executory contract for post mortem services 
became enforceable only if it had either been committed to writing or 
witnessed by a disinterested party. 
These statutes were premised on the hazards of fraudulent evidence. In 
a much-cited opinion, a judge in West Virginia defended the statutes as 
serving  
to prevent an undue advantage on the part of the living over the 
dead, who cannot . . . give his version of the affair, or expose . . . 
falsehoods of such survivor. . . . Any other view of the subject . . . 
would make [the estates of the dead] an easy prey for the dishonest 
and unscrupulous . . . .
297
  
This argument mimics the indictment leveled against nuncupative wills.
298
 
Yet, it is a striking fact that the trend lines of the two doctrines have 
progressed in opposite directions. At one time, the two doctrines were 
effectively symmetrical. Witnessed oral wills made in the eleventh hour 
were widely valid as an exception to the usual writing requirement, 
whereas oral contracts made in the eleventh hour also widely required 
witnesses, an exception to the usual rule that contracts needed none. But 
over the past half century, the doctrines have diverged. Statutes validating 
nuncupative wills have waned relentlessly, making testamentary transfers 
near death more difficult to formalize. Simultaneously, restrictive dead 
man’s statutes have also waned, making near-death contracts less difficult 
to prove. 
Today, only nine states allow witnessed nuncupative wills for any 
testator near death, typically with a variety of other restrictions,
299
 whereas 
thirty-two states now allow a surviving party to prove even an unwitnessed 
contract formed near death, and without any additional safeguards.
300
 No 
 
 
 296. For a modern discussion, see Ed Wallis, An Outdated Form of Evidentiary Law: A Survey of 
Dead Man’s Statutes and a Proposal for Change, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 75 (2005–06).  
 297. Owens v. Owens’s Adm’r, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878) (Haymond, J.). The passage is quoted 
without citation in MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 101 cmt. b (1942). 
 298. See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 272, 284, 286–87 and accompanying text. 
 300. The latest survey of these statutes appears in Wallis, supra note 296, at 82–100. See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.2 reporter’s note 7 
(2003).  
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clear pattern connects the doctrines within individual states. Of the nine 
remaining jurisdictions with relaxed rules for nuncupative wills, four 
continue to restrict evidence of a contract via some form of dead man’s 
statute.
301
 Among the thirty-two states that have repealed the dead man’s 
statute, only five allow nuncupative wills.
302
 The Uniform Law 
Commissioners, in separate products, endorse the contradictory doctrines: 
the Uniform Probate Code forbids nuncupative wills,
303
 even as the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence abolish the dead man’s statute.304  
The same dissonance is reflected in modern commentary on the two 
respective doctrines. Earlier, we noted academic criticism of nuncupative 
wills as inviting “fraud and perjury.”305 With equal vehemence, evidence 
scholars have condemned the dead man’s statute, making arguments on 
the contracts side that seem directly responsive to criticism on the 
inheritance side:  
The survivor’s temptation to fabricate a claim . . . is evident 
enough—so obvious indeed that any jury should realize that his 
story must be evaluated cautiously. In case of fraud, a searching 
cross-examination will often reveal discrepancies in the ‘tangled 
web’ of deception. In any event, the survivor’s disqualification is 
more likely to disadvantage the honest than the dishonest 
survivor.
306
  
And so, witnessing requirements seen as insufficient on one side of the 
categorical divide are perceived as excessive on the other. Inheritance 
scholars have deplored nuncupative wills as “obsolescent and 
outmoded”307 at the same time as evidence scholars have condemned the 
dead man’s statute as a “relic.”308 Because the alternative forms of transfer 
are categorically distinct, the contradiction has gone largely unnoticed.
309
 
Lawmakers are often farseeing, but they have poor peripheral vision. 
 
 
 301. These are: Ind., N.C., Tenn., and Vt. 
 302. These are: Kan., Miss., Mo., N.H., and Ohio. 
 303. See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text. 
 304. UNIF. RULES OF EVID. ACT R. 601 (1999), 13A U.L.A. 103 (2004). 
 305. See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text. 
 306. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 86, § 65, at 316; see also, e.g., 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 578, at 821 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1979) 
(offering a similar observation, and relating criticism of the dead man’s statute to criticism of the 
general bar on interested testimony, which was overturned in the nineteenth century). 
 307. Chaffin, supra note 281, at 329–30 (also labeling nuncupative wills “primitive”). 
 308. Charles T. McCormick, Tomorrow’s Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A. J. 507, 511 (1938); see 
also, e.g., Hew v. Aruda, 462 P.2d 476, 479 (Haw. 1969) (characterizing dead man’s statutes as 
“archaic”). 
 309. But cf. Langbein, supra note 22, at 501–02 (observing the condemnation of dead man’s 
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At another level, though, the doctrinal trends considered here are 
symmetrical. Both have tended in the direction of abolishing exceptions to 
ordinary will formalities on the one hand, and to contract formalities on 
the other. In former times, lawmakers operating within both fields 
discerned that near-death transfers presented a special evidentiary 
problem, meriting a special rule of formalization and proof. Today, for the 
most part, lawmakers in both fields (as well as in the field of gifts) 
disregard the problem’s particularity.  
V. CATEGORICAL FICTIONS 
The infelicities of formality addressed thus far arise in atypical cases. 
Only occasionally do transfers stray beyond the situational sphere for 
which their formalizing rules were tailored. There exists, however, another 
class of transfers where infelicities of formality crop up systematically. 
These are transfers whose substantive characteristics qualify them for one 
category, but which courts nonetheless insist on assigning to a different 
category. 
This insistence has flowed from hydraulic pressure, welling from 
below, to accomplish legal outcomes that parties could not achieve 
otherwise, and that a court could not make available to them otherwise. 
Consider a historical example: the doctrine of nominal consideration. 
Parties who wish to create an enforceable gift promise run headlong into 
the rule that a promise becomes binding only when supported by 
consideration—a rule of common law, to be sure, but one so hallowed by 
precedent that no court could overrule it. In response, some parties have 
sought to finesse the rule by disguising their gift promises as contractual 
bargains, made in exchange for a peppercorn. For a time, courts played 
along, presumably because they recognized the legitimacy of the 
aspiration, and perhaps also because they saw no harm in doing so. Fuller 
defended the doctrine of nominal consideration on the ground that “the 
desiderata underlying the use of formalities are here satisfied by the fact 
that the parties have taken the trouble to cast their transaction in the form 
of an exchange.”310 In other words, the exchange of the peppercorn for the 
promise represented an alternative kind of symbolic act, which Fuller 
compared to a seal,
311
 indicating the finality of the gift promise. Modern 
courts have turned their backs on the doctrine of nominal consideration, 
 
 
statutes as a justification for a substantial compliance doctrine for will formalities). 
 310. Fuller, supra note 6, at 820. 
 311. Id. 
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despite its arguable serviceability.
312
 But other disguised forms of transfer 
persist and have even flourished in our era. 
These newer, fictional transfers emerged out of the modern enthusiasm 
to avoid probate. Provoked by popular accounts of the delays and abuses 
of the probate system, which governs all testamentary transfers by virtue 
of statutory law, testators have sought to reclassify their bequests as inter 
vivos gifts, thereby circumventing the jurisdiction of the probate court.
313
 
Once again, courts have cooperated in this game of make-believe. 
Revocable inter vivos trusts (commonly known as “living trusts”), life 
insurance policies with revocable beneficiary designations, bank accounts 
with revocable pay-on-death designations, and now many other similar 
devices, take effect today as present transfers, even though in functional 
terms they remain simulacrums of bequests under wills.
314
 Modern jargon 
acknowledges the fiction: These devices have become known collectively 
as “will substitutes,”315 serving in that capacity—as everyone knows—but 
without the need for a probate proceeding. 
Because will substitutes take the guise of inter vivos transfers, they not 
only avoid probate—as a side-effect, they also escape the reach of the 
formalizing rules applicable to wills. In most jurisdictions today, settlors 
who name themselves as trustees of their own living trusts can create them 
by mere oral declaration, no differently from irrevocable trusts that 
actually do begin to operate in præsenti.
316
 The Uniform Law 
Commissioners defend their failure to modify the formalizing rules 
applicable to will substitutes:  
 [T]he benign experience with such familiar will substitutes as 
the revocable inter vivos trust, the multiple-party bank account, and 
United States government bonds payable on death to named 
 
 
 312. For a discussion of the doctrine and its fall, see 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 96, § 2.11. 
 313. For a further discussion of the doctrinal evolution of this fiction, see Adam J. Hirsch, 
Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem of Doctrinal Change, 79 OR. L. REV. 527, 
542–46, 567–68, 570–71 (2000).  
 314. Earlier courts often insisted on a showing that the transferor had given up some present right, 
no matter how insignificant, so as to distinguish a revocable transfer (if only slightly) from a bequest 
of property that the transferor continued to own outright, see, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 
600, 603 (Ill. 1955), an exercise which Gulliver and Tilson compared to a “shell game.” Gulliver & 
Tilson, supra note 5, at 37. Modern courts have abandoned this pretense. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. b (2003); see also, e.g., Welch v. Crow, 206 P.3d 599, 604–06 (Okla. 2009). 
 315. E.g., MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 196, § 6.3, at 299. 
 316. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10 & cmt. c & illus. 3, § 25; UNIF. TRUST CODE 
§ 401 & cmt. (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 478 (2006). The Uniform Probate Code creates a safe harbor 
for living trusts committed to writing, while leaving the validity of those created by oral declaration to 
judicial doctrine. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101 & cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. 354 
(2013). 
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beneficiaries all demonstrated the evils envisioned if the statute of 
wills were not rigidly enforced simply do not materialize. . . . 
[B]ecause these provisions often are part of a business transaction 
and are evidenced by a writing, the danger of fraud is largely 
eliminated.
317
 
This observation, in fact, echoes an earlier assessment by Gulliver and 
Tilson
318
 and likewise corresponds with Fuller’s appraisal of nominal 
consideration.
319
 By hypothesis, the creation of a will substitute involves 
protocols different from, but sufficient to take the place of, those 
demanded by the statute of wills. Because many will substitutes come into 
being as a result of a “business transaction”320 with an insurance company 
or a bank, for example, the semi-formal act that establishes the 
relationship to the business entity indicates finality; meanwhile, the entity 
in question will undertake to preserve evidence of the transaction.  
The point is arguable, at least in connection with will substitutes 
created through financial intermediaries.
321
 But the observation ultimately 
begs the question. Will substitutes, we are told, “often are part of a 
business transaction and are evidenced by a writing.”322 But what if they 
are not?  
That is the problem raised by the popular living trust, if and when one 
is homemade by a settlor who serves as his or her own trustee. If created 
by oral declaration, such a living trust becomes the functional equivalent 
of a nuncupative will—but without requiring multiple witnesses and 
without confining the declaration to the vicinity of death.
323
 At least in 
connection with other trusts where the settlor acts as trustee, he or she has 
immediate fiduciary duties to perform. Their performance indicates that 
the settlor considered the declaration as legally operative.
324
 That is not 
true of living trusts, however. In recognition of the fictional nature of these 
 
 
 317. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 3 U.L.A. 354 (2013). For an 
elaboration by the co-Reporter for this article of the Code, see John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate 
Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1130–34 (1984). 
 318. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 23–26, 38–39.  
 319. See supra text accompanying notes 310–11. 
 320. See supra text accompanying note 317. 
 321. For criticisms, see N. William Hines, Personal Property Joint Tenancies: More Law, Fact 
and Fancy, 54 MINN. L. REV. 509, 557–58 (1970); William M. McGovern, Jr., The Payable on Death 
Account and Other Will Substitutes, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 7, 12 (1972). 
 322. See supra text accompanying note 317 (emphasis added). 
 323. For a recent example of an informal amendment to a living trust, albeit an amendment made 
in writing, see Rouner v. Wise, No. WD 75305, 2013 WL 3880150, at *1–3 (Mo. Ct. App. July 30, 
2013). 
 324. See supra note 129. 
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transfers, the settlor-qua-trustee of a living trust has no enforceable duties 
to perform,
325
 making the finality of any declaration, or even of an 
unwitnessed writing, that purports to create such a trust all the more 
uncertain.
326
 
In other respects, relaxing the formalizing rules applicable to will 
substitutes carries special risks in connection with living trusts. Revocable 
pay-on-death designations are confined to particular items of property, 
naming the ultimate taker (or takers) of those items. These designations 
correspond functionally with what the law classifies as “specific” 
bequests.
327
 As such, pay-on-death designations are naturally simple and 
hence should be relatively easy to remember (so long as they are not 
subdivided among too many beneficiaries). Also because they are simple, 
pay-on-death designations are naturally standardized. 
By contrast, living trusts can encompass any sum of property up to the 
whole of a transferor’s estate; they function to replace wills, not individual 
bequests. As such, living trusts may feature complex terms, including a 
limitless number of bequests, structured and organized according to the 
whims of the settlor. As with other complex transfers, living trusts cry out 
for memorialization, to preserve evidence of their provisions, as well as 
for professional drafting, to render those provisions readily intelligible.
328
 
A situational approach to living trusts would treat them as just another 
variety of anticipatory transfer. Accordingly, along with anticipatory gifts 
and contracts, living trusts would have to comply with the formalizing 
rules that apply to wills.
329
 Despite this change, lawmakers could continue 
to maintain the temporal fiction that living trusts comprise inter vivos 
transfers and hence avoid probate. Situational formalizing rules can 
operate independently of the substantive rules that regulate individual 
categories of transfer. Two states have already moved in this direction by 
 
 
 325. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 & cmt. a(1) (2007); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) 
& cmt. (amended 2010), 7C U.L.A. 553 (2006); see also, e.g., Fulp v. Gilliland, 998 N.E.2d 204, 207–
10 (Ind. 2013); In re Trust # T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 482–90 (Iowa 2013); Ladd v. Ladd, 323 
S.W.3d 772, 778–79 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010); Gunther v. Gunther (In re Stephen M. Gunther Revocable 
Living Trust), 350 S.W.3d 44, 46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).  
 326. For an early recognition of the problem, see Aronian v. Asadoorian, 52 N.E.2d 397, 398 
(Mass. 1943). 
 327. On the classification of bequests, see MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 196, § 8.1 at 340. 
 328. In this regard, given that some states have statutory will forms, see supra note 28 and 
accompanying text, shouldn’t these be accompanied by statutory trust forms? For an academic 
proposal, see Gerry W. Beyer, Simplification of Inter Vivos Trust Instruments—From Incorporation by 
Reference to the Uniform Custodial Trust Act and Beyond, 32 S. TEX. L. REV. 203, 238–53 (1991). 
 329. The same principle could also apply to other will substitutes, in which case the financial 
intermediaries that market these transfers would doubtless undertake to meet the applicable 
formalization requirements.  
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making living trusts subject to formalizing rules similar or identical to 
those that govern wills.
330
 These stabs at reform have yet to attract the 
attention of commentators.  
CONCLUSION 
From the beginning, lawmakers have broken down the rules of 
property transfers into discrete categories. Formalizing rules are framed 
individually, and operate exclusively, within the respective provinces of 
gifts, wills, and contracts. The same is true, of course, of substantive rules. 
In adhering to this configuration, formalizing rules are only running—
well—true to form. 
Alternative organizational structures are nonetheless possible and 
plausible. Some other sorts of non-substantive rules—rules of procedure, 
rules of construction, rules of equity—have risen to transcend categorical 
barriers or have even become separate, superimposed categories 
themselves. Lawmakers could distinguish formalizing rules in the same 
way. The traditional ones took shape to deal with, and are adequately 
adapted for, their archetypal circumstances. When we vary those 
circumstances, shifting gifts, let us say, forward to the moment of death, or 
delaying their maturity, formalizing rules can become maladaptive. And 
that is true across the board for transfers lawmakers relegate to 
inappropriate categories as a matter of legal fiction, in order to accomplish 
other objectives. 
The problem has not entirely escaped lawmakers: Historically, as we 
have seen, formalizing rules in some places and times have included 
exceptions for atypical situations. Unusually, though, formalizing rules 
have drifted in the direction of fewer exceptions and hence toward greater 
intra-categorical homogeneity, in defiance of the ordinary pattern whereby 
rules accumulate exceptions over time.
331
 At least in connection with 
formalization, the traditional dividing lines appear to have become, if 
anything, increasingly conspicuous and definitive. There exist today more 
situational exceptions from the substantive rules of the several types of 
transfers than from the formalizing rules of those same transfers. Why that 
 
 
 330. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3545(a) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0403(2)(b) (West 
2010). In nine additional states, all inter vivos trusts are subject to heightened formalization 
requirements. See supra note 130. Estate planners who professionally draft living trusts often prefer to 
execute them in the presence of witnesses, even where none are legally required. See DOUG H. MOY, 
LIVING TRUSTS 53 (3d ed. 2003) (recommending the practice). 
 331. For discussions, see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98–
100 (1921); Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (1991). 
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is true, and why formalizing rules have continued to consolidate within 
their respective categories, represents a jurisprudential mystery that we 
must leave for another day.  
This Article proposes a new framework for formalizing rules, founded 
not on the category of transfer but rather on the setting within which the 
transfer takes place. Transfers that a party carries out on the spot, or delays 
with a long fuse, or makes on death’s door, call for different formalizing 
rules, irrespective of the substantive category into which the transfers fall. 
If lawmakers reframed formalizing rules to vary by situation, rather than 
by category, they would have no need to carve out any exceptions at all. 
Transferors would then formalize all manner of transfers with similar 
situational characteristics in the same manner. Meanwhile, hoary faux-
distinctions between formalizing rules hinging on the subject matter of a 
property transfer would finally pass from the scene. And with the new 
lines in place, subsidiary aspects of formalizing rules, including perhaps a 
rogatio testium requirement for witnesses,
332
 could all begin to operate 
meta-categorically. 
There remain some arguable drawbacks to this approach, however. For 
one, it fails to “canalize” transfers, in Fuller’s terminology,333 by keying 
each discrete formalizing rule to a particular kind of transfer. If, for 
instance, lawmakers required transferors to formalize wills, living trusts, 
and gifts that become possessory at death in exactly the same way, then 
courts might have a harder time distinguishing which one a transferor 
intended to implement as a matter of substance—and, of course, the 
substantive attributes of each differ. But precisely because of those 
differences, the words setting out the terms of a transfer should help to 
clarify which kind a transferor had in mind.
334
 At the same time, the 
current distinctions between formalizing rules fail to clarify intent with 
assurance, since transferors sometimes over-formalize their transfers. It is 
not unusual for settlors to formalize living trusts like wills, for example.
335
 
At the end of the day, this consideration appears secondary, at best. 
Another concern is that situational distinctions are less clear-cut than 
categorical ones, creating uncertainty for transferors ex ante and possibly 
 
 
 332. See supra text accompanying notes 262–63, 284, 290–91 (discussing the virtues of this 
formality, currently confined within the realm of deathbed transfers to nuncupative wills). 
 333. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 334. See In re Catanio, 703 A.2d 988, 992–93 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding a 
document labelled a trust to comprise instead a codicil, because the document “by its own terms 
provides that it will become effective upon the settlor’s death,” while also noting that the document 
had been executed in compliance with the statute of wills). 
 335. See supra note 330. 
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prompting litigation ex post.
336
 Whereas transfers postponed “until death” 
have characteristics that are sharply defined, transfers occurring “near 
death” occupy a fuzzier range, rendering less clear which formalizing rule 
applies.
337
 But the cost of using situational criteria here is again likely to 
be slight. Courts have already amassed a substantial body of case law to 
elaborate the meaning of nearness to death in the context of gifts causa 
mortis,
338
 mitigating if not foreclosing uncertainty, which lawmakers could 
incorporate by reference into any broader application of this variable. And 
transferors can assure themselves that their transfers are valid in close 
cases by (again) over-formalizing them, assuming they have the time and 
opportunity to do so. 
If lawmakers nonetheless deem a reorganization of formalizing rules 
too radical to contemplate, they could in the alternative retain the current 
categories while carving out symmetrical situational exceptions from each 
of them. The difference is largely cosmetic—but not entirely so. Without 
reconfiguring the categories, each one would remain technically isolated, 
so that rulings on, say, the meaning of a “near death” transfer within the 
law of gifts causa mortis would fail to pertain to nuncupative wills.
339
 In 
order fully to glean the benefits of situational consolidation, lawmakers 
would have to incorporate a unified situational definition into each 
category and state that rulings within one category become precedents 
applicable to all—a situational framework in all but name.  
The larger point merits restating. The substantive rules of transfers are 
category-specific because those transfers serve different functions.
340
 
Formalizing rules, in turn, are less closely connected to functional 
differences between transfers. Time does its work, parol evidence carries 
 
 
 336. Clarity of rules—even at the cost of fairness—is generally considered a virtue within the law 
of transfers of all sorts. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 4, at 1065–66. 
 337. One way to ameliorate this problem would be to define nearness to death in distinct units of 
time. One of the substantive rules in the Uniform Probate Code is structured in this way. See UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-205(3) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 158 (2013). Although that would clarify 
matters from the standpoint of courts, assaying a transfer after the fact, a transferor aiming to validate a 
transfer before the fact would still face uncertainty about when death might ensue and hence about 
which formalizing rule was operative.  
 338. See BORKOWSKI, supra note 237, at 45–53; BROWN, supra note 91, § 7.18. 
 339. Historically, those meaning have remaining distinct, and courts have judged the extent of 
infirmity required for gifts causa mortis and for nuncupative wills according to separate standards. See 
Irish v. Nutting, 47 Barb. 370, 387 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1867) (“[I]n order to constitute a good donatio 
mortis causa, it was not necessary that the donor should be in such extremity as is required to give 
effect to a nuncupative will.”). 
 340. Even this point may be something of an overstatement. I have argued elsewhere that, as 
concerns substantive doctrine, the different varieties of transfer raise kindred problems that at a 
minimum call for comparative analysis and, at least in some respects, justify doctrinal consolidation. 
See Hirsch, Freedom, supra note 4. 
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risks, irrespective of the legal carriage that parties use to move property. In 
respect of formalizing rules, the shape of the carriage matters less—far 
less—than the condition of the road. 
Or, to put the case more whimsically: just as Dean Jonathan Swift’s 
Gulliver looked quite different and out of place when cast into one 
environment or another, so today can we say the same of Dean Ashbel 
Gulliver’s formalizing rules. 
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